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A comparative analysis of Anglo-Australian pre-packs: 
Can the means be made to justify the ends? 
 
 
“Well, at first sight it strikes us as dishonest, 
But if it's good enough for virtuous England- 
The first commercial country in the world- 
It's good enough for us.” 
 
King Paramount in Utopia Limited 
by Gilbert and Sullivan 
(towards the end of Act I) 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Pre-packs are spreading like wildfire around the world. Different forms of what are 
being described as “pre-packs” are developing in a number of jurisdictions.1 The 
United Kingdom (“UK”) version of a pre-pack appears to be largely unique in that the 
entire process is dealt with outside of court with no requirement to obtain the prior 
consent of different classes of creditor. It would appear to be the market leader. The 
relative popularity of the UK pre-pack can be seen in the keenness of some companies 
to relocate to the UK specifically for the purpose of entering into a pre-pack 
administration. Such relocation has led to the accusation that the UK has become the 
“bankruptcy brothel” of the world.2 
In the UK a pre-pack has been defined as “an arrangement under which the sale of all 
or part of a company’s business or assets is negotiated with a purchaser prior to the 
appointment of an administrator, and the administrator effects the sale immediately 
on, or shortly after, his appointment.”3 As with all definitions there are likely to be 
cases on the border-line which arguably do or do not fall within its terms but for 
present purposes it gives a clear indication as to what will be discussed below. 
Against the tide of the pre-pack contagion, Australia’s voluntary administration law 
and practice appear to have remained resistant to the UK brand of pre-packaged sales.  
The voluntary administration regime in Australia and the administration regime in UK 
share many common features and each have drawn on the other throughout their 
evolution and refinement over the last 20 years.  Australia’s voluntary administration 
                                                            
 Mark Wellard, School of Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. 
 Dr Peter Walton, School of Law, Social Sciences and Communications, University of 
Wolverhampton, United Kingdom.  
1See e.g. Phillips and Kaczor “The Benefits of UK-style Pre-packs and Comparisons with other 
Jurisdictions” (2010) 7(5) International Corporate Rescue 328 and Sorenson and Tetley “French Pre-
packs: Key Stages and their Related Issues” (2010) 7 (1) International Corporate Rescue 7.  
2A comment accredited to Bertrand des Pallieres one of the junior creditors aggrieved by “the largest 
pre-pack” in UK history, that of Wind Hellas (Times 18th January 2010). There has been much 
publicity adverse to pre-packs (see the references in footnote 2 of Finch “Pre-Packaged 
Administrations and the Construction of Propriety” (2011 JCLS 1). Parliamentary reports have also 
questioned their efficacy (see e.g. the Sixth Report of the House of Commons Business and Enterprise 
Select Committee – HC198). 
3Paragraph 1 of Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (“SIP16”). 
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regime originated in 1993 as a procedure commenced exclusively by an out-of-court 
appointment of an administrator - something which the UK did not embrace until the 
Enterprise Act 2002 reforms a decade later and which arguably kick-started the UK 
pre-pack trend.  Despite the parallels of the two regimes, differing customs and 
standards have emerged which warrant reflection by policy-makers and practitioners 
in both jurisdictions.   
The pre-pack question in both the UK and Australia sits at the forefront of an ongoing 
debate as to the appropriate balance between “creative insolvency” outcomes and 
stakeholder participation (or due process) in insolvency procedures.  It is fair to say 
that too much of the latter must necessarily compromise the former.  At the risk of 
drawing too creative an analogy, it might be said that UK practitioners advocate a 
“benevolent dictatorship” approach to pre-packaged insolvency solutions, exercising 
their significant powers of sale immediately upon their appointment (invariably with 
the very best of intentions for the company’s creditors).  On the other hand, the 
Australian approach is generally to eschew early business sales in voluntary 
administrations without creditor or court approval, appearing to subscribe to the view 
of one of the mother country’s renowned former prime ministers who famously 
declared that “democracy is the worst system, except for all others”.                            
As with many of these sorts of debates, it is difficult to declare that one jurisdiction 
has got it all right or all wrong.  The purpose of this paper is to consider the criticisms 
to which pre-packs have been subject in the UK, to consider why UK-style pre-packs 
have not been readily adopted in Australia (and how they might be embraced) and 
finally to propose one way in which a pre-pack regime could be modified or designed 
to work to the advantage of all stakeholders without the controversies which have 
haunted its early years in the UK. 
II THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRE-PACK IN THE UK 
It is widely accepted that although pre-packs were used to a limited extent, in the 
context of receivership, prior to the changes brought about by the Enterprise Act 
2002,4 it was this Act which proved to be the catalyst for their burgeoning popularity. 
The reasons for this can be stated simply. The Enterprise Act introduced a new system 
of administration under Sch B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“the Act”). The Act 
contains no mention of a pre-packaged version of administration. It is the ability 
under Schedule B1 to appoint an administrator out of court with minimal formality 
which has led to the recent widespread adoption of the pre-pack version of 
administration.5 The statutory regime is used in this way: a deal is agreed to buy the 
company’s business; the buyer is often a person connected to the company; the 
company is put into administration out of court;6 and immediately the administrator 
transfers the business to the buyer for a pre-agreed price without the need for a 
creditors’ meeting to be called to consider the terms of the deal.7  The process is quick 
                                                            
4 This statement is based upon practitioner comments made at a panel discussion held at the London 
offices of Ernst & Young on 20th November 2006 entitled “Prepacks: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”. 
5 See e.g. Harris “The Decision to Pre-Pack” Winter 2004 Recovery 26, 27. 
6 Either by the holder of a qualifying floating charge under Sch B1, para 14 of the Act or by the 
directors or the company under Sch B1, para 22 of the Act. 
7 There are detailed provisions within the Act which deal with the administrator’s duty to prepare a 
proposal to put to creditors and to call a creditors’ meeting to have that proposal voted upon. In a pre-
pack any proposal and creditors’ meeting by definition occur after the pre-pack has already been 
executed. In addition, there is no requirement for the administrator to call a creditors’ meeting under 
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and, in the right circumstances, arguably brings about the best possible resolution for 
all stakeholders in the company.8  The business survives, jobs are saved and more 
money is raised for the creditors than would have been the case in an immediate 
liquidation. 
Once the pre-pack has been executed, the administrator will distribute the proceeds of 
sale. There is frequently no money in the pot for the unsecured creditors9 in which 
case the administrator may immediately file a notice at Companies House to dissolve 
the company.10 If there is some money for the unsecured creditors, the administrator 
will usually be appointed as liquidator to make the distribution to the unsecured 
creditors and then takes steps to dissolve the company.11 In either post pre-pack 
scenario, no independent insolvency practitioner is likely to be appointed to assess the 
pre-pack unless disgruntled junior creditors decide to take action against the 
administrator, which will be expensive and by no means guaranteed to be successful. 
Difficulties experienced in traditional trading administrations are sometimes 
suggested as a further reason for the widespread adoption of pre-packs. Suppliers to 
companies which enter a traditional administration appear to change the terms and 
conditions of that supply which makes the administrator’s task of trading the 
company more difficult.12Complexities in the law relating to employees’ rights13 and 
expenses including pension contribution notices,14 rent15 and business rates16 have 
encouraged a move away from traditional trading administrations.17 Estimates as to 
how many pre-packs occur each year vary from 27-29%18 of the total number to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Sch B1, para 52, where he or she thinks that, inter alia, no payment will be made to the unsecured 
creditors (apart from under the prescribed part provisions of s.176A of the Act).  The court has held, in 
Re Transbus International Ltd [2004] 2 All ER 911 that the effect of these provisions is that, even 
where para 52 does not apply, the administrator is permitted to exercise any statutory powers available 
under Sch 1 of the Act, including the power to sell company assets, without first calling a creditors’ 
meeting or applying for directions from the court. 
8 For early support for careful use of pre-packs see e.g. Harris “The Decision to Pre-Pack” Winter 2004 
Recovery 26 and Ellis “The Thin Line in the Sand – Pre-Packs and Phoenixes” Spring 2006 Recovery 3.  
For a less positive view of pre-packs see Moulton “The Uncomfortable Edge of Propriety – Pre-Packs 
or Just Stitch-Ups?” Autumn 2005 Recovery 2. 
9 Frisby A preliminary analysis of pre-packaged administrations – Report to The Association of 
Business Recovery Professionals August 2007 (the “Frisby Report”) at p65. In approximately 80% of 
pre-packs there is no money available to unsecured creditors apart from under the prescribed part 
provisions of s176A of the Act. The Sixth Report of the House of Commons Business and Enterprise 
Select Committee (HC198) suggests that only 1% of unsecured debt is paid in pre-packs. 
10Sch B1, para 84. 
11Sch B1, para 83. 
12See the comments made to the House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills Committee on 
Tuesday 24th January 2012 available at   
http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=9951 (last accessed on 7th March 2012) 
where an extension of s233 of the Act was suggested. 
13See e.g. Key2Law (Surrey) LLP v De’Antiquis [2011] EWCA Civ 1567. 
14See e.g. Re Nortel Gmbh, Bloom v Pensions Regulator [2011] EWCA Civ 1124. 
15See e.g. Goldacre (Offices) Ltd v Nortel Networks UK Ltd [2010] Ch 455. 
16See e.g. Exeter City Council v Bairstow [2007] BCC 236. 
17See the comments made to the House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills Committee on 
Tuesday 24th January 2012 available at: 
http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=9951 (last accessed on 7th March 2012). 
18Insolvency Service Report on the Operation of Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 July - December 
2009 p5 and Insolvency Service’s Report on the Operation of Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 for 
2010 at p5. 
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between 50-80%.19 Either way, there are quite a lot of them and they are not going 
away. 
As there is no mention of pre-packs within the Act, it is not surprising that the 
insolvency profession, the courts and the UK Government have struggled to come to 
terms with them. The following is a summary of the principal contributions made by 
those respective bodies to the pre-pack procedure. 
1 The Profession – Managing Conflicts in a Pre-Pack 
As from the 1st January 2009, the insolvency profession adopted a new Insolvency 
Code of Ethics (“the Code”). 20  A breach of the Code may lead to professional 
disciplinary proceedings but will not necessarily be grounds for the removal by the 
court of the administrator.21 The Code sets out five fundamental principles of integrity, 
objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional 
behaviour.22  The Code sets out a framework enabling insolvency practitioners to 
identify actual or potential threats to any of the fundamental principles. If a threat is 
identified, the insolvency practitioner must then consider if the threat may be 
neutralised by putting in place appropriate safeguards. If no appropriate safeguards 
are available, the insolvency practitioner must not act or continue to act in the 
matter.23 
One obvious threat to the objectivity of a pre-packing administrator is where the 
administrator has advised either or both the company and any secured creditor in the 
planning stage of the pre-pack.24 Once appointed as administrator, a duty is owed to 
all the company’s creditors.25 This duty might be seen as conflicting with the decision 
which has already been made to pre-pack the business. Paragraph 51 of the Code 
specifically highlights that “where the assets and business of an insolvent company 
are sold by an Insolvency Practitioner shortly after appointment on pre-agreed terms, 
this could lead to an actual or perceived threat to objectivity.” The Code suggests that 
the threat to objectivity in these circumstances may be managed by, for example, 
obtaining an independent valuation or considering other potential purchasers.  
It is quite permissible for an administrator to act subsequently as liquidator of the 
same company. Indeed the Act assumes this process to be commonplace.26  Such 
sequential appointments contain an inherent threat to the fundamental principle of 
objectivity and this is accentuated with a pre-pack administration. The Code states 
that sequential appointments should not be accepted unless: disclosure is made of the 
threat to objectivity to either the Court or the creditors on whose behalf the 
                                                            
19 The Frisby Report at p15. 
20 The Code replaced the previous Insolvency Ethical Guide (dating from January 2004). It was 
produced by the Joint Insolvency Committee which was formed in 1999 to facilitate discussion 
between the Recognised Professional Bodies (“RPBs”) and to ensure, as far as is possible, that each 
RPB is governed by the same ethical standards. Each of the RPBs is represented on the Committee. 
The Code is intended to align ethical guidance to insolvency practitioners more closely with the 
International Federation of Accounting Bodies’ Code. 
21 See Sisu Capital Fund Limited v Tucker [2006] BPIR 154. 
22 The Code, para 4. 
23 The Code, paras 5-19. 
24For a detailed consideration of how the terms of the Code might impact upon a pre-pack see the 
discussion in Walton “Pre-Packin’ in the UK” [2009] International Insolvency Review 86. 
25 Sch B1, para 3(2) of the Act. 
26 Sch B1, para 83. 
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practitioner would be acting and no objection is made to the appointment; and 
safeguards are put in place to eliminate or reduce the threat to an acceptable level.27  
A new Statement of Insolvency Practice, SIP 16, was introduced by the profession in 
an attempt to head off complaints that creditors were not being informed of how and 
why the pre-pack was entered including details as to any valuations of the business.28 
SIP 16 requires detailed information to be provided to creditors and so makes the 
process more transparent. On the downside, this information is only provided once the 
pre-packaged deal has been completed.29 SIP 16 does not require the administrator to 
hold a creditors’ meeting30 to explain what has happened and why. The Government 
has been monitoring compliance with SIP16 and has found that full compliance 
increased from 62% in 2009 to 75% in 2010. Although a significant number of 
insolvency practitioners have been referred to their respective Recognised 
Professional Bodies in relation to breaches of SIP16, few such breaches have been 
found serious enough to warrant regulatory action.31  
The profession therefore sees potential conflicts, which might arise in a pre-pack 
situation, as generally capable of being managed. This applies to insolvency 
practitioners who, in a pre-pack, will invariably be involved in advising the company 
in the run-up to the pre-pack’s execution and also pre-pack administrators who 
frequently take on the subsequent role as liquidator. Compliance with SIP 16 is 
designed to assist in managing these conflicts. Full information as to the terms of the 
pre-pack deal will be provided to creditors who can therefore consider whether the 
insolvency practitioner has effectively managed threats to objectivity. The Code’s 
pragmatic approach is reflected in the context of a pre-pack administration in favour 
of connected parties. In advising the company, prior to the administration, the 
administrators (consistently with para 5 of SIP16) would stress that they are advising 
the company (or its lenders) but not the company’s directors. There will be no conflict 
when the pre-pack is subsequently executed in favour of the company’s directors. The 
relative subtlety of this argument might be lost on the unsecured creditors who merely 
see the insolvency practitioner advising on and executing the pre-pack deal in favour 
of the management team, and then acting subsequently as liquidator.  
2 The Courts – From Early Sales to Pre-Packs 
The courts have moved away from a position which emphasised the importance of 
creditors having a say in any plan of the administrator,32 to one where the courts see 
                                                            
27 The Code, para 24.  
28 SIP 16 requires the administrator to explain to the creditors, inter alia, how the administrator came to 
be involved, the extent of his or her involvement prior to appointment, a full explanation of any attempt 
to market the business, any valuations, alternative courses of action which were considered, why a pre-
pack was decided upon, whether major creditors were consulted, and full details of the sale including 
the price and the identity of the buyer. Breach of SIP 16 will be prima facie evidence of professional 
misconduct. 
29 SIP 16 appears to be based upon the idea that as long as the pre-pack process is explained in detail 
after the deal is done, the creditors should accept that the provision of information to them is a 
sufficient quid pro quo for their losing their statutory right to participate in the process and to vote on 
the administrator’s plans. 
30 SIP 16 does not require a creditors’ meeting to be held but requires that when one is held that it is 
held as soon as possible after the appointment. 
31See the Executive Summary of the Insolvency Service Report on the Operation of Statement of 
Insolvency Practice 16 for 2010 and the R3 report “Pre-packs and SIP 16” March 2010. 
32See e.g. Peter Gibson J in Re Consumer and Industrial Press Ltd (No2) (1988) 4 BCC 72 at 73 and 74.    
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the financial bottom line as being the most important factor.33 Concerns that the 
statutory regime is not designed for this type of procedure have been largely swept 
aside in favour of achieving the best price possible for the business.34 The commercial 
decision of the practitioner is seen as all-important and it is very difficult for 
unsecured creditors to attack that commercial judgment.35 
Once an administrator has decided that rescuing the company as a going concern is 
not reasonably practicable, he or she must next consider realising the company’s 
assets in the most efficient manner possible.36  If the only realistic possibility of 
achieving a good price for the business is a buyer (often connected to the company) 
who requires the sale to be completed quickly, the administrator will wish to go for an 
early sale. This desire appears to conflict with the statutory requirement to send a 
proposal to the company’s creditors (within 8 weeks of appointment)37 and to call a 
creditors’ meeting (within 10 weeks of appointment)38 to consider that proposal. If the 
administrator waits for the green light from the creditors, the buyer may have left the 
scene. The creditors might then understandably complain that the administrator has 
been negligent. To go ahead with a quick sale clearly negates the views of any 
subsequent creditors’ meeting which might equally upset the creditors. The courts 
were initially reluctant to allow such early sales without creditor consent recognising 
that any subsequent creditors’ meeting would be entirely powerless.39 Despite such 
early reservation the courts have now concluded that early sales are entirely 
permissible. Re T & D Industries Limited40 clearly established that as long as the 
administrator’s decision to sell early is reasonable, he or she will not be liable for 
breach of any duty. It is purely a matter for the commercial and professional judgment 
of the administrator.41  
It was a relatively small step, it would appear, for the courts to move from approving 
early sales in administration to approving the idea of a pre-pack. If a trading 
administration is seen as likely to destroy goodwill or to reduce significantly the sale 
price,42 a pre-pack may be seen by the insolvency practitioner as the only feasible 
option.43 
                                                            
33See e.g. DKLL Solicitors v HMRC [2008] 1 BCLC 112; Re Kayley Vending Limited [2009] BCC 578 
and Re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA (in administration) [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch), 
[2010] BCC 295. 
34 Re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA (in administration) [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch), 
[2010] BCC 295. 
35 See e.g. Shean “Administrators: above the law?” (2011) 6 Corporate Rescue and Insolvency 184.  
36 Sch B1, para 3 of the Act. 
37 Sch B1, para 49 
38 Sch B1, para 51 (no meeting need be called if the criteria in para 52 are satisfied – this includes the 
situation where the company has insufficient property to make any payment to unsecured creditors 
(apart from under the prescribed part provisions of s176A)). 
39 See e.g. Re Consumer and Industrial Press Ltd (No2) (1988) 4 BCC 72 and Re NS Distribution Ltd 
[1990] BCLC 169. 
40 [2000] BCC 956. 
41 See also Re Transbus International Ltd [2004] 2 BCLC 550 where the court followed T & D 
Industries. 
42 For a list of the grounds relied upon by pre-packaging administrators justifying the decision to pre-
pack see the analysis by R3 entitled: “Pre-packs and SIP 16” March 2010. 
43 See e.g. the court’s approval of a pre-packaged deal in DKLL Solicitors v HMRC [2008] 1 BCLC 
112.   
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The courts have on a number of occasions given their approval to such pre-packs.44 It 
seems it is now too late to argue that they are inherently inconsistent with the 
fiduciary position of administrators or the statutory code.45 But the courts have not 
found it easy to identify the grounds upon which a pre-pack should be assessed. 
Indeed, Lewison J has commented: “It is not entirely easy to see precisely where in 
the statutory structure the court is concerned with the merits of the pre-pack sale.”46 
There is no doubt that administrators are fiduciaries but their fiduciary character does 
not prevent them advising the company prior to, and then executing the pre-pack. It 
would seem that the courts might be alive to complaints about pre-packs where the 
administrator has acted where there is an actual or potential conflict of duty. The 
problem facing any complainant is that the courts have tended to approach the issue 
of insolvency practitioner conflicts of duty in a flexible manner not obviously 
dissimilar to that found under the profession’s Code.  
Adopting an essentially pragmatic approach, the courts have shown themselves loath 
to replace conflicted insolvency practitioners, due largely to a desire to ensure 
efficiency and save money.47 The courts have, in addition, shown a willingness to 
permit administrators to be appointed by the court even where the insolvency 
practitioner has disclosed prior relationships with the company suggesting potential 
conflicts of interest and duty.48 The court has even approved a pre-pack where a 
majority of unsecured creditors were steadfastly against the plan.49 
It may be that due to the relatively small number of very large firms of accountants 
specialising in insolvency work that the courts and the profession have had to be 
pragmatic about how they deal with conflicts of interest.50 The idea that a significant 
proportion of conflicts might be capable of being managed does arguably lead to a 
more cost effective result for all concerned. If there is a potential conflict but none yet 
in existence, it is pragmatic to wait and see whether one does arise and then deal with 
it if it does. Cases such as Re Arrows Ltd,51 Re Maxwell Communications Corporation 
plc52 and Parmalat Capital Finance Ltd v Food Holdings Ltd53 highlight the courts’ 
willingness to cope with a conflict, should one arise, by, for example, the appointment 
                                                            
44 See e.g. DKLL Solicitors v HMRC [2008] 1 BCLC 112, Re Kayley Vending Limited [2009] BCC 578, 
Re Johnson and Machine Tool Co Ltd [2010] BCC 382 and Re Hellas Telecommunications 
(Luxembourg) II SCA (in administration) [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch), [2010] BCC 295. 
45 For arguments that the pre-pack procedure is inconsistent with the statutory scheme see Walton “Pre-
packaged Administrations – Trick or Treat?” (2006) 19 Insolvency Intelligence 113. 
46 Re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA (in administration) [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch), 
[2010] BCC 295 at [8]. 
47 See e.g. Sisu Capital Fund Ltd v Tucker [2006] BCC 463. Even if the courts do not remove an 
administrator they may still report a lack of objectivity to the administrator’s professional body for the 
consideration of disciplinary action: see e.g. Mourant v Sixty UK Ltd [2011] 1 BCLC 383 in the context 
of a lack of objectivity in advice on a company voluntary arrangement. 
48 Re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA (in administration) [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch), 
[2010] BCC 295. 
49 DKLL Solicitors v HMRC [2008] 1 BCLC 112. 
50 See in particular the comments by Morritt V-C in Re Barings plc (No 1) [2001] 2 BCLC 159, where 
his Lordship considers the problems of having so few large firms who have so many potential conflicts 
of duty. His Lordship suggested that the Official Receiver might need to be appointed to avoid 
conflicts in circumstances similar to those before the court.  
51 [1992] BCC 121. 
52 [1992] BCC 372. 
53 [2008] BCC 371. 
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of an additional independent practitioner or to require independent legal advice on a 
particular issue.  
The courts’ flexible approach in the context of pre-packs appears to have some limits. 
It has been recognised, in certain circumstances, that a pre-pack does need the benefit 
of a review by an independent insolvency practitioner. Clydesdale Financial Services 
Ltd v Smailes54 involved a pre-pack administration sale of a solicitors’ practice. The 
court ordered the replacement of the administrators. A majority of the creditors 
supported this move. The court expressly stated that there was no suggestion that the 
administrators who were removed had acted in any improper manner. The principal 
issue was that on the evidence available to the court, there was a significant issue 
raised by the majority of creditors as to whether or not the sale of the business was at 
a significant undervalue. As part of this determination, it appeared that the 
administrators had not fully complied with SIP 16 in terms of providing full 
information about the sale. Although not a typical management buy-out pre-pack, the 
main participator in the solicitors’ practice was subsequently employed by the 
purchaser on attractive terms. The court found that the terms of the pre-pack sale 
constituted a legitimate matter for an independent review. This independent review 
required an independent administrator to be appointed.55 
 
In Re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA (in administration)(No2),56 
following a court ordered pre-pack administration, the court ordered that the company 
be put into compulsory liquidation. Although the court accepted that the 
administrators had carried out appropriate investigations into the affairs of the 
company, the court was persuaded that there remained matters which a liquidator 
could potentially investigate. Such matters included the role of a firm of accountants 
who were connected to the administrators’ firm whose involvement had not been 
disclosed to the court when the administration order was made. It seems the court 
regarded the potential conflict of interest and duty of the administrators as a matter 
which could only be investigated by an independent office holder.57 
 
Such appointments appear to be the exception and require a determined effort by 
junior creditors. There is no right, unless cause can be shown, to have the pre-pack 
assessed by an independent insolvency practitioner. The perceived lack of 
independence of the pre-packing administrator, especially where the pre-pack is in 
favour of connected persons, is still therefore a significant matter of concern to 
disenfranchised unsecured creditors.  
3 The Government – Much Ado About Nothing 
                                                            
54 [2009] BCC 810. 
55 The court considered the alternative of a creditors’ voluntary liquidation with an independent 
insolvency practitioner acting as a liquidator but appears to have been swayed by the consequential 
delay this option would cause and also the majority creditors’ wish for a replacement administrator. 
56 [2011] EWHC 3176 (Ch). 
57 Sales J also emphasised the wider purposes of a winding up and cited Lord Millett’s dicta in Re 
Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd [2004] 1 AC 158 at [64] where his Lordship said: “I reject the unspoken 
assumption that the functions of a liquidator are limited to the administration of the insolvent estate. 
This is only one aspect of an insolvency proceeding; the investigation of the causes of the company's 
failure and the conduct of those concerned in its management are another….” 
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The Government supported the introduction of SIP16 and has carried out assessments 
of its effectiveness, going as far as referring certain pre-packs to respective 
Recognised Professional Bodies for investigation.58 
 
The Government has engaged in two consultations considering if and how controls on 
pre-packs should be introduced.59 The suggestions made in the consultations have not 
been acted upon and appear to have been kicked into the long grass. The first 
consultation, launched in March 2010 by the previous Government, suggested, inter 
alia; that SIP 16 should be given statutory force; that following a pre-pack 
administration the company should be placed into compulsory liquidation, so as to 
achieve automatic scrutiny by the official receiver of directors’ and administrators’ 
actions; that different insolvency practitioners should undertake pre and post 
administration appointment work; and/or that the approval of the court or creditors, or 
both, would be needed to approve all pre-pack business sales to connected parties. 
The present Government has dropped these proposals. The latter three would have 
gone a long way to ensuring an independent assessment of the pre-pack takes place, 
either before or after its execution but would have added significantly to the costs of 
the administration.60 
 
With a change of government came a change of approach to reform of pre-packs. The 
second consultation, launched in March 2011, was based upon a draft Statutory 
Instrument which, had it come into effect, would have required: administrators to give 
three days’ notice to creditors where the proposed sale is to a connected party; all pre-
pack administrators to file SIP16 information at Companies House; and all pre-pack 
administrators to confirm that the sale price represents best value for the creditors. 
Ultimately, the Government decided to take no action but to keep the matter under 
review. The reason given was that it preferred to adhere to its policy of imposing “a 
moratorium on regulations affecting micro-business.”61 The main criticisms of these 
proposals were firstly, that the three day notice period would effectively frustrate the 
whole point of a pre-pack, that is, its speed and secrecy; and secondly that the 
declaration that the price represented best value would impose an onerous duty upon 
the administrator to the point that pre-packs would be less likely. 
 
4 The Result (so far) 
The only decisive action taken by the Government thus far has been to rush through a 
statutory instrument ensuring pre-pack administrators could get their pre-appointment 
fees approved.62 The courts have fired some warning shots across the boughs of pre-
                                                            
58 See Insolvency Service Report on the First Six Months Operation of Statement of Insolvency 
Practice 16, Insolvency Service Report on the Operation of Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 July - 
December 2009 and Insolvency Services Report on the Operation of Statement of Insolvency Practice 
16 for 2010. 
59 The first was issued by the Insolvency Service in March 2010 and was entitled a Consultation/Call 
for Evidence on “Improving the transparency of, and confidence in, pre-packaged sales in 
administration”. The second, with the title, dates from March 2011. 
60See Walton “Government Consultation: Is It Time to Re-Pack the Pre-Pack?” (2010) Issue 273 Sweet 
& Maxwell’s Company Law Newsletter 1. 
61Written Ministerial Statement 26 January 2012 by Edward Davey, Minister for Employment 
Relations, Consumers and Postal Affairs, on “Pre-packaged sales in insolvency” made on 26 January 
2012 found at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/Consultations/PrePack?cat=closedwithresponse (last 
accessed on 25th March 2012). 
62 Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2010 (SI 2010/686). 
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packing administrators in emphasising that the decision to pre-pack is the decision of 
the insolvency practitioner and he or she will need to be able to defend the decision to 
pre-pack.63 Where the pre-pack is in favour of the incumbent management team, the 
courts have expressly held, in specific circumstances, that the administration is for the 
benefit of the management team not the creditors.64 The profession has introduced SIP 
16 which is designed to ensure that creditors are given full information as to how and 
why a pre-pack has been entered. The Government has been assessing the 
profession’s adherence to the requirements of SIP16 and has made a number of 
references to the professional bodies to look at possible breaches of professional 
conduct.65 
Action taken to regulate pre-packs has been somewhat ad hoc and lacks decisiveness. 
There has been an element of pass-the-parcel about how the courts, the Government 
and the profession have approached regulating pre-packs.  
The problems perceived by critics of pre-packs tend to run together. There is a 
perception that a conflict of duty exists where administrators have advised the 
company and recommended the pre-pack, especially where the pre-pack is in favour 
of the management team; that administrator may have carried out or supervised 
limited marketing of the business prior to the pre-pack; that administrator may have 
commissioned valuations; there may be a perception that full value has not been 
realised; senior creditors will almost certainly have been consulted; junior creditors 
will not have been consulted; there is unlikely to be any creditors’ meeting at all and 
even if one is held, it will be impotent as it will only happen after the sale is 
completed; the sale proceeds will be distributed to the senior creditors who will have 
the power to approve the administrator’s fees (assuming no distribution to the 
creditors is  possible apart from under s176A); no independent assessment is made of 
the directors’ and administrator’s conduct and decision making; junior creditors are 
often out of the money and remain so even if the pre-packaged business goes onto 
success; no independent insolvency practitioner is appointed to consider the pre-pack, 
either before or after it is executed.66 
5 Déjà vu? 
The disquiet caused by pre-packs is reminiscent of two former practices: the first 
known as Centrebinding67 (so named after the case of Re Centrebind Ltd68); and the 
second, the “Phoenix Syndrome.”  
                                                            
63See e.g. Re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA (in administration) [2009] EWHC 
3199 (Ch), [2010] BCC 295. 
64See e.g. Re Kayley Vending Limited [2009] BCC 578, Re Johnson and Machine Tool Co Ltd [2010] 
BCC 382 and Walton “Re Kayley Vending Limited: Pre-pack Administration – is its Achilles Heel 
showing?” (2010) 31 Company Lawyer 85. 
65The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales is currently investigating the Wind 
Hellas pre-pack triggered by a complaint from a junior creditor not the government (Daily Telegraph 
28th February 2011). 
66It is interesting to note that the Pensions Regulator has announced that it is currently investigating a 
number of pre-pack administrations in relation to pensions’ liabilities (Daily Telegraph 31 October 
2011). 
67 Reference might be made to the debate in the House of Commons on 19 October 1981 where the 
Centrebinding exploits of Maurice Sidney Caplan, known as “Hissing Sid,” and his associates are 
discussed: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1981/oct/19/meetings-of-creditors-and-
centerbinding (last accessed 24th March 2012). 
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Centrebinding involved a company passing a resolution to enter voluntary liquidation 
and at the same general meeting appointing a friendly liquidator. No creditors’ 
meeting was ever called which would have had the power to replace the members’ 
nominated liquidator. The liquidator would sell the business on, often to a new 
company formed by the company’s management team at a bargain price. Section 166 
of the Act was passed specifically to outlaw this practice by requiring the court’s 
sanction to any sale by the liquidator prior to the creditors’ meeting.  
Centrebinding and pre-packs have a number of similarities. In both, an office holder is 
appointed without the involvement of the creditors and proceeds to sell the business 
on, often to a connected party. The only real difference is that Centrebinding could be 
carried out by unqualified office holders whilst pre-packs must be conducted under 
the auspices of a licensed insolvency practitioner.69 The practice of Centrebinding 
was described by the Government White Paper leading to the passing of s166 in the 
following terms: “[it] effectively wrests control from the creditors and provides scope 
for the disposal of assets at below their true value, possibly involving collusion 
between the liquidator and the company’s directors.”70 
The Cork Committee, described what is colloquially known at the “Phoenix 
Syndrome” in the following way:  
[T]he ease with which a person trading through the medium of one or more 
companies with limited liability can allow such a company to become insolvent, form 
a new company, and then carry on trading much as before, leaving behind him a trail 
of unpaid creditors, and often repeating the process several times. The dissatisfaction 
is greatest where the director of an insolvent company has set up business again, 
using a similar name for the new company, and trades with assets purchased at a 
discount from the liquidator of the old company.71 
The Cork Committee recommended a restriction on the directors of failed companies 
being able to benefit from limited liability in the immediate future:  
[A] person who, at any time during the period of two years prior to the 
commencement of its insolvency, has been a director… of a company… which has 
gone into insolvent liquidation shall, unless the Court otherwise orders… be 
personally liable for the relevant liabilities of any other company … of which he is or 
becomes a director… and which commences or continues trading within 12 months 
after the commencement of the insolvent winding up of the first company and itself 
goes into insolvent liquidation within three years after such commencement.72 
The Government of the day thought this suggestion to be too draconian. The White 
Paper73 outlining the purposes of what became the Insolvency Act 1986 states:  
The Government is concerned to remedy the abuse identified by the Review 
Committee and has considered the imposition on directors of a measure of personal 
liability for subsequent failures. It has, however, not been possible to adopt the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
68 [1967] 1 WLR 377. 
69 It has been suggested that s166 was unnecessary as the requirement for insolvency practitioners to be 
licensed from 1985 onwards should have prevented the practice in itself.  See e.g. Sealy and Milman 
Annotated Guide to the Insolvency Legislation (14th ed, 2011, Sweet and Maxwell) at p160. 
70A Revised Framework for Insolvency Law (1984) Cmnd. 9175 at para 20. 
71 At para 1813. 
72 Ibid at para 1827. 
73 A Revised Framework for Insolvency Law (1984) Cmnd. 9175. 
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Review Committee’s proposals because the Government considers that they are too 
far reaching and whilst they would curb the activities of the delinquent director they 
would, at the same time, deter the genuine entrepreneur from risking his capital in a 
further venture.74  
The Government was of the view that the strengthened powers of disqualification 
(under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986) and possible liability for 
wrongful trading (under s 214 of the Act) would without more deal with the problem 
of the “Phoenix Syndrome.”75  
No express provision was therefore made in the Insolvency Bill 1985 for the 
outlawing of the “Phoenix Syndrome.” What are now ss 216-7 of the 1986 Act were 
introduced late in the Parliamentary passage of the Insolvency Act 1985. 76  The 
provisions are a strange way of controlling the mischief as they merely control the re-
use of the name (a “prohibited name”) of the company which has gone into insolvent 
liquidation.77 The provisions, described as an “afterthought”78 by Professor Milman, 
provide that a director of a company that has gone into insolvent liquidation cannot be 
involved in the management of a second company using the same or similar name to 
that of the failed company for a five year period. The provisions have no effect on 
participation in a successor company which does not adopt the same or a similar name. 
A prohibited name is one by which the liquidated company was known at any time in 
the 12 months immediately prior to the liquidation. The restriction applies to any 
person who was a director of that company at any time during the 12 months prior to 
the liquidation. The prohibition may in individual circumstances be lifted with 
permission of the court. There also exist three specific exceptions.79 Breach of s 216 
is a criminal offence and under s 217 will lead to the person in breach being held 
personally liable for the successor company’s debts. 
The problem of the “Phoenix Syndrome” has not been solved by ss 216-7 as the 
provisions are relatively easy to navigate around and even when applicable only apply 
to the re-use of the previous corporate name. Pre-packs in favour of connected parties 
look extremely similar to the descriptions and concerns articulated by the Cork 
Committee back in 1982. Sections 216-7 were not and are not the answer to legitimate 
concerns of unsecured creditors. Even where ss 216-7 are breached, there is no 
remedy for the creditors of the first liquidated company. 
                                                            
74 Ibid at para 55. 
75 Ibid at para 56. 
76 See generally Werner “Phoenixing – avoiding the ashes” [2009] Insolvency Intelligence 105. 
77 The company goes into liquidation for these purposes if it passes a resolution to wind up voluntarily 
or if the court makes a winding up order (s247(2) Insolvency Act 1986). 
78 Milman “Curbing the phoenix syndrome” [1997] JBL 224 at 225. 
79 See Insolvency Rules 4.228-4.230 (1 - If the liquidator sells the business to a company where there 
would otherwise be a breach of s216, the connected persons may give the required notice of their 
intention to use a prohibited name. The notice must be published in the Gazette and given to all known 
creditors, at the latest within 28 days of completion of the sale. The same notice provisions apply if the 
sale is to be made by an administrator and a subsequent insolvent liquidation is anticipated; 2 - If the 
director in question applies to the court for permission under s216, as long as the application is made 
within 7 days of the winding up, the director is not subject to the restrictions under s216 for a period of 
six weeks following the liquidation (or earlier date if the court deals earlier with the application); 3 - 
The restriction does not apply if the company in question was using the prohibited name continuously 
for the 12 months prior to the winding up of the liquidated company). 
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The problem of Centrebinding was dealt with by banning the activity. The “Phoenix 
Syndrome” has in part been discouraged. There is no obvious appetite for outlawing 
pre-packs in the UK.80 It remains to be seen whether a solution to concerns about pre-
packs can be arrived at which satisfies all stakeholders. A number of possible 
compromises have been considered by both the present and previous UK 
Governments but none has been adopted. There remains at least one possibility not 
yet considered by the UK Government, which will be considered below.  
Prior to that, it is instructive to assess the current situation and debate in Australia as 
to whether pre-packs can (or should) become a customary feature of insolvency 
practice.   
III LOOKING AT THE MENU BUT JUST CAN’T EAT: 
AUSTRALIA’S PRE-PACK DEBATE 
 
The widespread use of pre-packs in UK administrations has gained the attention of 
Australian insolvency practitioners, turnaround specialists and commentators in recent 
years.  Given the similarities between the UK regime and the Australian voluntary 
administration regime, this is unsurprising.  However, the cosmetic similarities of the 
UK and Australian legislation belie significant underlying differences in general law, 
custom and practice.  These distinguishing jurisdictional features explain why the 
prevalence of UK pre-packaged administrations has not been emulated in Australia.  
The Australian experience also provides a useful frame of reference for UK policy-
makers when considering how their brand of pre-packs might be regulated in the 
future.    
1. That’s not a pre-pack, that’s a pre-pack 
When Australian insolvency practitioners, lawyers or academics discuss the notion of 
pre-packs it not uncommon for there to be an initial acknowledgment of the 
conceptual merits of pre-packing.  However, somewhat paradoxically such 
conversations often turn to the necessity of obtaining creditor approval of such a sale - 
either by a deed of company arrangement (“DOCA”)81 or at least notifying creditors 
(e.g., at their first meeting)82 of an intention to sell the business with court approval.  
Of course, the customary UK pre-pack involves no formal creditor participation or 
court approval and is, at its very core, a procedure which relies on the implementation 
of a business sale transaction immediately upon the initiation of an out-of-court 
voluntary administration process.              
The emerging commentary upon pre-packs in Australian literature demonstrates that 
the notion of a “pre-pack” means different things to different people. As Brown has 
                                                            
80See the ministerial statement by Edward Davey MP, Minister for Employment Relations, Consumers 
and Postal Affairs, on “Pre-packaged sales in insolvency” made on 26 January 2012 found at: 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/Consultations/PrePack?cat=closedwithresponse (last accessed on 
25th March 2012). 
81 Generally speaking, a deed of company arrangement (or “DOCA”) is the Australian equivalent of the 
UK’s company voluntary arrangement or “CVA”. 
82 Under Australia’s voluntary administration regime a first creditors’ meeting must be held within 8 
business days of appointment. Strictly speaking, the only purposes of that meeting are to determine 
whether the administrator is to be replaced by creditors (as of right) and whether to establish a creditors’ 
committee.    
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noted, “a “pre-pack” is not a legal term of art.”83   The debate as to whether Australia 
should embrace pre-packs sometimes appears to avoid illuminating or addressing the 
garden-variety UK pre-pack “warts and all”.  In Australia the concept of “acting early” 
upon an appointment of an administrator to preserve business value is readily grasped, 
but the procedural reality (i.e., that early action diminishes creditor participation) is 
where pre-packing begins to meet with dampened enthusiasm or even downright 
resistance.        
In Australian voluntary administrations the company’s creditors (save for any court 
extension of the statutory timetable) meet some 15 to 25 business days following the 
appointment of administrators to determine the fate of the company. Creditors are 
effectively presented with the choice of either voting for liquidation or alternatively 
accepting a DOCA which will address the company’s present insolvency and 
immediate future. 84   Like the analogous UK company voluntary arrangement 
(“CVA”), a DOCA is a flexible instrument subject to negotiation and circumstance.  
A DOCA may take the form of either (at one end of the spectrum) a complex 
restructuring/work-out/genuine company rescue, or (at the other end of the spectrum) 
a de facto or “glorified liquidation”, or anything in between.   
Poulos and McCunn contend that pre-packs can be completed through DOCAs in 
Australia: 
From a definitional perspective, the defining feature of a pre-pack is that the 
transaction is negotiated to near completion such that the desired outcome is known 
prior to the appointment of the insolvency practitioner.  In accordance with that 
understanding of pre-packs, the timing of the execution of the sale is a factor that 
only affects whether all of the benefits of pre-packing are achieved.  Timing does not 
determine whether a particular transaction is a pre-pack.  In that sense, a pre-pack can 
be completed under a DOCA.85  
However, the reality is that pre-packing as it is understood and practised in the UK 
very rarely (if at all) occurs through a CVA.  Most UK pre-pack sales occur well in 
advance of any creditors’ meeting which might be held to consider “proposals” for the 
administration.  A CVA is one possible proposal for achieving the purposes of an 
administration of a UK company, just as a DOCA can be proposed to creditors (to 
vote upon in meeting) under Australia’s Part 5.3A voluntary administration regime.  
However, UK administrators implementing a pre-pack sale customarily exercise their 
power of sale immediately upon appointment and, in so doing, preclude a CVA as a 
starter in the way of a proposal for consideration at the creditors meeting held some 
10 weeks subsequent to the sale.  Indeed, the UK pre-pack itself often ensures that no 
proposals of any substance are able to be put to creditors at the subsequent meeting, 
because the company has already been divested of its essential value by reason of the 
business sale.  
It is the very absence of creditor (or court) participation, approval or oversight which 
is the essence of the UK pre-pack and its lauded benefits.  UK pre-packs are praised 
                                                            
83 Brown “Unpacking the pre-pack” (2009) 9(10) Insolvency Law Bulletin 164. 
84 Sections 439A and 439C Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provide that at the second creditors’ meeting 
convened by the administrator the creditors may resolve that the company execute a DOCA, that the 
administration end (rare) or that the company be wound up.     
85 Poulos and McCunn “Pre-pack transactions in Australia” (2011) 19 Insolvency Law Journal 235, 
254.  
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because they deploy an armoury of limited publicity, speed and creditor 
disenfranchisement, all in the interests of achieving the efficient closure of a sale and 
thereby delivering a seamless transition for a company’s business to the successor 
entity (purchaser).  Creditor approval of a pre-packaged sale of a distressed 
company’s business (for example, by means of a DOCA) is anathema to the 
customary UK practice where such sales are viewed as ideally completed immediately 
upon the administrator’s appointment.  Waiting several weeks for a creditors’ meeting 
to approve a sale suffers from the very drawbacks which UK proponents contend are 
avoided by a pre-pack – namely, substantial delay and publicity which are both 
destructive of business value.  
Despite maintaining the prospect of pre-packing under a DOCA, Poulos and McCunn 
concede that “[t]he speed with which pre-pack transactions are effected soon after the 
formal appointment is the key to their success in reducing the loss suffered by a 
company.”86  To put it another way, the more protracted the post-appointment process 
required to complete a sale, the greater the risk of destruction of business value (such 
that the administrator may only be left with a bucket of water, rather than a block of 
ice, to sell).  Poulos and McCunn suggest legislative reform to allow abridgement of 
the statutory timetable for creditor meetings to facilitate a “rapid sale or restructure 
through a DOCA.”87  Quite apart from the fact that such a mechanism already exists 
under the present legislation (albeit by application to court)88, an abridged process 
would still have to contain minimum notice requirements necessitating at least some 
“delay” following the administrator’s appointment.  It is noteworthy that the UK 
Government’s 2011 announcement of its intention to mandate three days notice to 
creditors of pre-pack sales to connected parties prompted hue and cry from pre-pack 
advocates who claimed that even this modest delay would defeat the advantage of 
speed which is integral to the customary pre-pack sale.89                 
                                                            
86 Ibid 256.  
87 Ibid 255. Similarly, Turnaround Management Association of Australia (“TMAA”), in its 2 March 
2010 submissions (pp 6-11) in response to the Australian Government’s insolvent trading discussion 
paper, called for legislative amendment to allow the convening of a creditors’ meeting within 5 
business days of appointment to consider a DOCA proposal.  TMAA submitted that “there is currently 
no ability for the Court to shorten the convening period [for the second creditors’ meeting] if the 
circumstances so require” and that “if an administrator wished to implement a sale or restructure 
almost immediately after appointment through a deed of accompany arrangement, he or she would 
need to wait at least 15 business days after the commencement of the administration before putting the 
proposal to creditors.”  (Section 439A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that the second 
creditors meeting must be held within 5 business days before or after the end of the convening period, 
the convening period usually being 20 business days starting on the first business day following the 
appointment.)  However, this aspect of TMAA’s submission does not accord with Re Sims, in the 
matter of Destra Corporation Limited [2009] FCA 1199 where Lindgren J of the Federal Court ordered 
(under s 447A) that where the applicant liquidators were proposing to instigate an administration the 
first creditors’ meeting could be dispensed with and the second creditors’ meeting could be held at any 
time during the convening period (subject to the usual 5 business days notice requirement).  Lindgren J 
made the abridgement order so that the administrators would not have to “sit on their hands” until five 
business days before the end of the convening period. 
88 Section 447A Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); Re Sims, in the matter of Destra Corporation Limited 
[2009] FCA 1199, as to which see above n 86.  
89 On 1 November 2011 the Gazette of The Law Society of England and Wales reported both comment 
from R3 that a 3 days notice requirement would be long enough to “derail a rescue” as well as the 
opinion of a law firm partner that the “concern with putting in three days for creditors to stop the sale 
going ahead is that you would take away the very reason why pre-packs work” (see the article at 
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/features/pre-pack-administrations-rule-changes-face-trouble). 
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It can therefore be argued that “pre-packing through a DOCA” is really no pre-pack at 
all and certainly not in the sense that pre-packs are commonly (and successfully) 
practised in the UK.  The UK naturally provides Australia with an analogous 
(voluntary) administration regime for comparative purposes.  It is the reported success 
of pre-packs in that jurisdiction which has provided the impetus for the debate in 
Australia as to their broader use or availability.  Accordingly, the manner in which 
UK pre-packs are customarily practised warrants focus and attention in Australia.  An 
abstract consideration of how pre-packs (however defined) might be achieved through 
DOCAs is something of an arid exercise given that such pre-packs are not reflective 
of either the reality or the successes of the UK experience.   
2. The roadblocks to pre-packing in Australia 
Reports of genuine pre-packs in Australia are sparse.90  Lloyd, O’Brien and Robertson 
acknowledge that “[t]his procedure has not been used to date in Australia” but also 
assert that “the legal infrastructure exists to permit pre-packaging.”91   Australian 
literature and case law support the conclusion that “day 1” pre-packaged sales by 
voluntary administrators (being the same insolvency practitioners who have advised 
the company prior to their appointment) are rare, if not non-existent.  The primary 
reasons for this position are twofold. Firstly, Australia’s general law imposes strong 
independence standards upon insolvency practitioners.  Secondly, the orthodoxy of 
Australian administrators is to effect “early sales” only in exceptional circumstances - 
a custom based upon an entrenched culture and regard for creditor participation in the 
voluntary administration process, but which is also supported by a statutory 
construction of the legislative regime (discussed below).  
In Australia, reference is often made to the country’s strict insolvent trading laws 
which are said to discourage directors from continuing to trade while obtaining advice 
to implement “creative insolvency” options (e.g., pre-packs) which would maximise 
business value.92  This point is well made.  However, even if “softer” insolvent 
trading laws were introduced, Australia’s independence standards and the aversion of 
administrators to early sales would still constitute two fundamental obstacles to the 
practice of a UK brand of pre-packing. 
3. Australian independence standards for insolvency practitioners – general 
law and professional codes of conduct 
Australia’s general law imposes strong and exacting independence standards upon its 
insolvency practitioners.  It is clear that the independence requirements of Australian 
administrators are no less than those of liquidators. 93   Both are recognised as 
                                                            
90 For some specific instances of pre-packs reported to have been implemented in Australia see Black 
“A crystal clear result (bankruptcy reorganization of glass company Waterford Wedgwood)” (2010) 
Intheblack 80(1) 42 and Bryant “An Analysis of the Use of ‘Pre-Pack’ Proceedings in an Insolvency 
Workout – Experiences from the UK and Australia” March 2011 Insol International Electronic 
Newsletter . These pre-packs were not sales to connected parties, appear to have involved unique or 
exceptional examples of group or corporate distress and were not of the “garden variety” ilk of pre-
pack commonly practised in the UK.  Of course, even in the UK pre-packs may present in any number 
of forms and circumstances.   
91 Lloyd, O’Brien and Robertson “Pre-packaged transactions in administration – strategy and 
application” (2009) 9(7) Insolvency Law Bulletin 110.  
92 Poulos and McCunn, above n 85, 243-246; TMAA submission, above n 87, 11-12.  
93 Commonwealth v Irving (1996) 144 ALR 172; Bovis Lend Lease v Wily (2003) 45 ACSR 612. 
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fiduciaries.  Australian courts have also demonstrated a willingness to deploy a 
heightened sense of scrutiny in respect of voluntary or “privately ordered” or nominee 
appointments.94  In very general terms, Australian voluntary administrators are not 
permitted under the general law to have “a substantial prior involvement” with a 
company to which they are appointed.  In Commonwealth v Irving95  Australia’s 
Federal Court held that prior contact is not completely prohibited as this would 
constitute “commercial unreality.”96  The court considered that a company obtaining 
“professional advice respecting actual or apprehended insolvency” would not 
disqualify that advising practitioner as a prospective appointee.97 However, the court 
also held that a “substantial involvement” with a company prior to its administration 
would “be seen to detract from the ability of the person to act fairly and impartially 
during the course of an administration.”98   
In Commonwealth v Irving the court noted the earlier Federal Court decision in Re 
Stadbuck Pty Ltd 99  where Sheppard J “spoke of an accountant, perhaps 
subconsciously, tending to favour those who had originally consulted him or her.”100  
The court in Commonwealth v Irving understood Sheppard J to be applying those 
observations to “a consultation or consultations on matters of ongoing business 
relevance.”101  In another case addressing the extent of permissible pre-appointment 
advice, the Queensland Supreme Court held that a line is crossed where a liquidator is 
involved in providing advice and consultations which go beyond basic financial 
advice (e.g., as to solvency) or general canvassing of options with a view to an 
appointment or initiation of some insolvency process.102         
This strict requirement of Australian insolvency law and practice was again 
demonstrated by the Federal Court in the recent case of Pinklillies Pty Ltd (Trustee), 
in the matter of Northwest Motel Group Pty Ltd (in liq) v Huxtable (“Pinklillies”).103  
In that case a liquidator was removed by the court by reason of his prior association 
with a creditor.  While the liquidator had disclosed the existence of certain 
relationships prior to his appointment, further details came to light subsequent to the 
winding up order which compromised the practitioner’s perceived independence.   A 
services company which employed the impugned liquidator and the creditor which 
had successfully applied for the winding up were both ultimately controlled by the 
same individual.  The applicant creditor’s debt was subsequently found to be in 
dispute and in the court’s view this fatally compromised the perception of 
independence on the part of the practitioner.  The Pinklillies decision is but another 
recent reinforcement of the long-standing principle in Australian general law that the 
appearance of independence of a liquidator (or administrator) is seen by the courts to 
be equally vital as actual independence.  In Pinklillies Logan J of the Federal Court 
referred to the longstanding line of authority in Australia that “[i]t is essential that the 
                                                            
94 Independent Cement & Lime Pty Ltd v Brick & Block Co Ltd (in liq) (recrs & mgrs apptd) (2010) 
267 ALR 613, [49]-[51]; Commonwealth Bank v Fernandez (2010) 81 ACSR 262, [60]-]88].   
95 (1996) 144 ALR 172. 
96 Ibid 177. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid.  
99 Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Shepard J, 18 May 1993. 
100 Commonwealth v Irving (1996) 144 ALR 172, 177. 
101 Ibid .  
102 Re Club Superstores Australia Pty Ltd (1993) 10 ACSR 730. 
103 [2011] FCA 1543. 
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independence and impartiality of a liquidator should at all times exist in point of 
substance, and be manifestly be seen to exist.”104  Logan J also stated:  
The test, in relation to the removal of a liquidator, is whether, having regard to the 
liquidator’s conduct as a whole, it can be said to be such as to give rise in the mind of 
a fair minded observer to a perception of a lack of impartiality as between the various 
interests that he or she as liquidator must serve, and a lack of objectivity in serving 
those interests. Apple Computer Pty Ltd v Wiley (2003) 46 ACSR 729 at 738.           
Logan J expressly noted that there was “no suggestion” that the impugned liquidator 
had “acted in any improper way in the conduct, to date, of the liquidation.”  His 
Honour held that “[t]he order for his removal does not carry with it any condemnation 
on my part in respect of the actions which he has or has not undertaken as liquidator.”  
Furthermore, Logan J rejected the solution of appointing a special purpose liquidator 
to determine the validity of the proof of debt of the “associated” creditor.  Logan J 
held that this would still leave the impugned liquidator having to assess all other 
proofs in the liquidation (or deciding whether to bring certain recovery proceedings) 
which would still affect the dividend which the “associated” creditor stood to receive.  
While the specific threat to independence in Pinklillies was not on all fours with that 
of a pre-pack administrator, the case does provide a timely restatement of the strict 
attitude Australian courts take to any adverse perceptions surrounding a practitioner’s 
appointment.      
The Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia (“IPA”) also promulgates a 
Code of Professional Practice (“CoPP”) which reflects (and in some respects extends) 
the Australian general law standards of independence to which its member 
practitioners are subject. While not strictly legally binding, Australian courts have 
recognised the “utmost importance” of the COPP in cases assessing the perceived 
independence of practitioner appointees and also (for example) the reasonableness of 
a practitioner’s remuneration.105  The provisions of the CoPP relating to independence 
are extensive.  In Australia the CoPP is a significant and established part of the 
insolvency practice landscape.   
The approach to insolvency practitioner independence in Australia might therefore be 
seen as “absolute.” There is very little room for negotiation or pragmatism. If there is 
a conflict identified, an insolvency practitioner will generally be removed. This 
contrasts with the approach of both the profession and the courts in the UK, where 
even if a conflict is identified, that conflict may be seen as being capable of being 
managed. The replacement of an office holder in the UK is seen as something of a last 
resort.    
4. Perceived independence and pre-packs: mutually exclusive?  
                                                            
104 Ibid [18] (Logan J). 
105 In Re Monarch Gold Mining Co Ltd; ex parte Hughes [2008] WASC 201, [34]-[40] Master 
Sanderson of the Western Australian Supreme Court stated that the “the code is something more than a 
public relations exercise designed to assuage the concerns of those involved with insolvency 
practitioners.”  Master Sanderson ordered a direction that administrators had tabled a Declaration of 
Independence, Relevant Relationships and Indemnities (“DIRRI”) in accordance with the CoPP, stating 
that the order would “necessarily add to the status of the code and assure the public generally that the 
courts regard adherence to its terms as a matter of utmost importance.”  In Golden Star Resources Ltd v 
Rosel [2010] QSC 28 the Queensland Supreme Court relied on the CoPP in determining whether the 
remuneration of receivers was reasonable.    
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It is hard to see how a compliant, “independent” Australian insolvency practitioner 
can ever be in a position to effect a “day 1” pre-packaged sale in a voluntary 
administration.  Indeed, regardless of the post-appointment timing of a pre-pack sale, 
it is hard to see how any Australian insolvency practitioner who has substantively 
advised or assisted on the detail of the pre-packaged transaction (i.e., advice going 
beyond the general availability of a pre-pack as an option) can subsequently take an 
appointment as voluntary administrator.  Poulos and McCunn concede that the 
independence standards prescribed by the IPA CoPP “are likely to somewhat restrict 
the scope of an insolvency practitioner’s involvement in negotiations for progressing 
a pre-pack sale prior to their formal appointment.”  However, Poulos and McCunn 
then contend: 
In practical terms, an insolvency practitioner may still be involved in a pre-pack sale 
if the pre-appointment involvement is providing advice about the alternative courses 
of action that are open to the company, which could include consideration of a pre-
pack sale. It may be that the sale is ultimately determined to be the best course, and 
the same practitioner is appointed as an administrator or receiver to complete the 
relevant transaction. The clear advantage of this approach is that the same practitioner 
that advised on the proposed pre-pack can complete the sale without the need to be 
brought up to speed with the details of the transaction. The practitioner would of 
course still need to declare his or her prior relationship under s 60 of the Act in 
completing their declaration of relevant relationships.106 
With respect, this is a fine line to walk for an Australian insolvency practitioner.  If 
the practitioner’s pre-appointment advice and assistance is of such substance and 
detail that he or she need not be “brought up to speed” upon appointment - or there is 
nothing left to do upon appointment except immediately implement the pre-negotiated 
sale - then the pre-appointment advice and assistance might well have “crossed the 
line” to constitute an impermissible “substantial prior involvement” of which the 
court spoke in Commonwealth v Irving.  Reflecting again on the perceptions of 
creditors (which count for everything in Australia’s general law test of independence) 
it is clear that an administrator implementing a “day 1” pre-pack sale will be 
reasonably perceived by creditors to be endorsing a strategy ultimately controlled or 
inspired by a company’s directors and with which the administrator has been 
substantively involved prior to appointment.  It is contended that detailed involvement 
and assistance with a pre-pack proposal (particularly a proposed sale to a party 
connected with the directors of the subject company) would ipso facto disqualify an 
Australian insolvency practitioner from taking an appointment as voluntary 
administrator.  The above course contended by Poulos and McCunn is obviously 
expedient and cost-effective, but in many circumstances could involve (rightly or 
wrongly) a failure to meet the standards of perceived and actual independence which 
Australian courts plainly require.  
It appears that very recently a similar view was reached by an Australian insolvency 
practitioner who applied for his own replacement in the case of DCT v West 
Apartments Pty Ltd (in liq).107  The replacement application was brought about by the 
original liquidator’s resignation due to his firm’s prior role as investigating 
accountants for a secured creditor.  The original liquidator had become aware of a 
                                                            
106 Poulos and McCunn, above n 85, 251-252. 
107 [2012] FCA 222. 
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contract of sale for one of the company’s properties during his initial investigations 
into the company’s affairs.  The contract of sale pre-dated the appointment of the 
original liquidator but had not yet settled or completed and, as the court noted, it 
would “be necessary for that contract to be considered and evaluated prior to the 
proposed settlement date.”108 The original liquidator (who was not aware of the prior 
role of his firm at the time of his appointment) decided that his resignation was 
appropriate because “there could be an appearance of a lack of impartiality on his part 
in the execution of his duties as liquidator.”109  While the reasons for judgment (in the 
application for the liquidator’s replacement) do not disclose more detail of the 
independence issues and concerns relating to the uncompleted contract, the parallels 
with a pre-pack sale are obvious.                       
The Australian parameters are thus far removed from the UK environment which has 
accepted the “pre-pack” practice of prospective administrators working side-by-side 
company directors to engineer pre-ordained outcomes of subsequent administrations.  
Such outcomes may well be judged by upstanding professionals to be in the best 
interests of creditors.  However, the fact remains that a customary UK pre-pack 
involves a pre-appointment assessment by a practitioner following discussions with 
directors who have already expressed a firm intention to appoint the said practitioner 
by means of an out-of-court, voluntary appointment process.  The issues and concerns 
surrounding “perceived independence” in this scenario are obvious.  In Australia the 
general law’s requirements of actual and perceived independence do not and would 
not allow practitioners to be put in such a position in the first place. 
5. Early sales in administration: not “orthodox” practice in Australia (yet) 
Australian voluntary administrators are often reluctant to countenance an early sale of 
a company’s business in the absence of court or creditor approval, and only then 
where there is a compelling justification.  Like the UK regime, Australian 
administrators enjoy an express statutory power to sell a company’s business at any 
time following their appointment.110  However, Australian practitioners often have an 
innate aversion to exercising such broad powers in a manner which may 
disenfranchise creditors.  Australian insolvency practitioners are sensitive to the fact 
that a significant, early exercise of a voluntary administrator’s powers will effectively 
make the creditors’ decision for them regarding the substantive outcome of the 
administration and the fate of the company.  Notwithstanding the plain general nature 
of their statutory powers of sale, administrators seeking to invoke those powers prior 
to the second “substantial” creditors’ meeting often seek court imprimatur for the 
contemplated “early sale.”   
This practice is evident in two recent Australian decisions where voluntary 
administrators applied to court for directions that they would be “justified” in 
effecting an early business sale (or that it would be “proper and reasonable” to do so).  
The two cases, Re Advanced Medical Institute Pty Ltd (admin apptd) and AMI 
Australia Holdings Pty Ltd (admin apptd)111 and Re Killer; North Coast Wood Panels 
                                                            
108 Ibid [6] (Yates J). 
109 Ibid [2] (Yates J). 
110 Section 437A Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  See also Re eisa Ltd (admin apptd); Application of 
Love (2000) 35 ACSR 394; Brashs Holdings Ltd v Shafir (1994) 14 ACSR 192. The equivalent power 
of UK administrators is contained in Sch 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK). 
111 [2011] NSWSC 574. 
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Pty Ltd (admin apptd), 112  have been the subject of considered analysis and 
commentary by Schaffer and McCoy who conclude:113  
It may be argued that, even if administrators do not need directions, they may still 
want their potential prophylactic benefits against as yet unforeseen complaints. The 
problem with that train of thought is that it ultimately negates both the clear conferral 
of power on administrators and another major policy underlying the enactment of 
Pt 5.3A — the creation of an insolvency regime that did not require court supervision 
as a matter of course. 
These cases illustrate an emerging awareness in Australia of the value of early action 
by administrators, but also that Australian administrators consider themselves 
exposed without a court order blessing an early and significant exercise of their 
powers.  These two decisions evidence a real and entrenched resistance to the practice 
of disenfranchising creditors without both good cause and some protection from later 
criticism or challenge.   
This resistance may not be purely attributable to culture or custom.  As a matter of 
statutory construction, the voluntary administration regime can be said ordinarily to 
require creditor participation in the determination of the substantive fate of the 
company.  Naturally, the statutory powers conferred upon administrators (and 
exercisable at any time upon appointment) sit in tension with the creditor participation 
also mandated by the regime.  It stands to reason that such tension must be 
approached and resolved as a question of statutory construction.  Rampant, customary 
early exercise of powers by administrators defeats the clear legislative intention that 
creditor participation be an ordinary feature of administrations and not a mere 
theoretical possibility.  It could be argued that a line must be drawn according to a 
reasonable statutory construction of the legislation establishing voluntary 
administration. In Australia there is at least one example of a court having attempted 
to arrive at something resembling a “test” in order to resolve this tension within the 
legislative regime.  
Carter v Global Food Equipment Pty Ltd (“Global Food”)114 has been previously 
identified for its relevance to the possible advent of pre-packs in Australia.115  In 
Global Food White J of the NSW Supreme Court was asked to extend the convening 
period for the substantial creditors meeting in circumstances where it was apparent 
that the extension sought would in fact provide the administrators a window within 
which they could complete a business sale and thereby render the substantial creditors 
meeting a non-event.  White J attempted to resolve the tension in the regime as 
follows:  
In principle, it seems to me that if the prospect of maximising returns to creditors was 
not jeopardised by the second meeting of creditors being held before any sales of 
businesses were effected, then it would be preferable for the second meeting of 
creditors to be held before the creditors were presented with what might be a fait 
accompli. 
                                                            
112 [2011] FCA 776. 
113 Schaffer and McCoy “Direct me if I am wrong…Early sales in voluntary administrations” (2011) 
12(1) Insolvency Law Bulletin 6, 8. 
114 (2007) 25 ACLC 1173. 
115 Brown, above n 83, 166. 
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Notwithstanding that it is the administrators’ right and their power to decide how the 
companies’ assets will be dealt with, the creditors have a legitimate expectation that 
the second meetings to decide the companies’ fate will be held swiftly and, hence, to 
consider the proposals in the deed of company arrangement which might be 
precluded by a sale. 
However, whilst this is the theoretical position, the sting is in the rider. The order 
extending the period for convening the second meeting … is sought by the 
administrators because they consider that a swift completion of the sale process will 
maximise returns to creditors. They are experienced insolvency practitioners whose 
judgment should be respected. It may be that prospective purchasers will be 
discouraged if they believe that they will be unable to complete the purchase 
swiftly.116 
 
The reasoning of White J could provide an answer to the anomalous reluctance of 
administrators to exercise their powers early without court protection (as questioned 
by Schaffer and McCoy).  White J’s statement of principle offers something of a 
potential guide for administrators in resolving this very real tension within the Part 
5.3A voluntary administration regime.  The primary question for an administrator 
considering an early sale (such as a pre-pack) is whether creditor return is 
demonstrably jeopardised by creditor participation.  If so, an administrator may 
exercise powers early to relieve creditors from this jeopardy.  No directions should be 
necessary – indeed, unnecessary applications for directions also impair returns to 
creditors of companies in administration.  As with any aspect of the conduct of an 
administration, administrators will need to justify their actions if subsequently queried 
or challenged.  However, the essential reasoning of White J suggests that the early 
exercise of powers by an administrator in a manner inconsistent with creditor 
participation should generally be regarded as the exception to the rule.117   
One revealing feature common to the early sales contemplated in Re Killer and 
Global Food was that the proposed early sale was “flagged” at the first creditors’ 
meetings in the respective administrations.118  Australian voluntary administrations 
require a first meeting of creditors within 8 business days of appointment but the 
meeting has the very limited dual purpose of (i) considering the possible replacement 
of the administrator and (ii) whether to establish a creditors’ committee.119  However, 
as these two cases show, first creditors’ meetings are often used by administrators for 
other informal purposes, including the provision of notice of the administrator’s 
intention to sell the company’s business prior to the substantial (second) creditors’ 
meeting.  In both cases it was clearly comforting to the court that the administrator 
had provided informal notice of the intended transaction to creditors at their first 
meeting, and that no creditors had voiced any objection to that course.  The role of 
first creditors’ meetings in Australia’s voluntary administration regime appears to 
discourage administrators taking significant action - such as a sale - before having at 
least gauged the attitudes of creditors in that forum.                  
                                                            
116 Ibid [18]-[20] (White J). 
117 Brown (above n 83, 166) appears to concur, contending that the judgment of White J does not 
endorse pre-pack sales as “the norm”.  
118 Similarly, in Re Eisa (above n 110) the administrator consulted with a committee of creditors 
elected at the first creditors’ meeting.   
119 Section 436E, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
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The manner in which Australian courts have sought to resolve this tension in the 
voluntary administration regime appears more cautious and “creditor-friendly” when 
compared with the UK experience.  Creditor participation is a concept which dies 
hard in Australian custom and culture, but the point should never be lost that such 
participation is contemplated and mandated in both the UK and Australian statutes 
establishing their respective administration regimes.  The test for the legitimacy of a 
pre-pack in the UK should really be no different to that espoused in Global Food – 
i.e., the practice must be justified in the interests of maximising business value (or 
preventing the destruction of it).  In reality, however, the prevalence of pre-packs in 
the UK means that the onus is largely upon aggrieved parties to demonstrate that the 
risk of destruction of value was overstated or illusory.  This is a difficult burden to 
discharge.  When hearing a formal challenge to an administrator’s decision to pre-
pack, UK courts are presented with an inexact, “crystal ball” task of determining 
whether there was in fact a risk to business value which justified early action in the 
form of a pre-pack.  It is not hard to see why the evidence of an insolvency 
practitioner’s judgment will be difficult to displace in circumstances where the 
alternative course of events will never be known.  How can a professional’s judgment 
be proven wrong except in the most clear-cut of circumstances?  (This issue is also 
relevant to the proposal discussed below which suggests how pre-packs might be 
made to take account of the subsequent reality of the post-sale fate and fortunes of a 
sold business.)     
The judgment in Global Food bears some similarity to the UK judgment in T & D 
Industries.  Both cases support a statutory construction of the respective 
administration regimes whereby court directions should not ordinarily be required if 
the administrator is satisfied that an exercise of the power of sale is justified. Prior to 
T & D Industries, the UK courts were reluctant to permit early sales and thereby 
disenfranchise unsecured creditors.  The point made by Schaffer and McCoy - that the 
propensity of Australian administrators to seek court approval of their conduct 
negates the out-of-court rationale for the voluntary administration regime - bears a 
striking resemblance to the reasoning of Neuberger J in T & D Industries:  
It seems to me that there is a powerful argument for saying that the fewer applications 
which need to be made to the court by administrators the better. From the point of 
view of the court, it is obviously undesirable to have a potential plethora of 
applications by administrators, many of them urgent, many of them pretty trivial even 
if important to the administration in question. Administration is meant to be a more 
flexible, cheaper and comparatively informal alternative, with a potentially less 
destructive result, to liquidation.120 
It is also interesting that the Australian practice of informal consultation with 
creditors in the first creditors’ meeting appears to dovetail with another part of the 
reasoning of Nueberger J in T & D Industries, where His Lordship discussed the 
imbalance which might be said to exist in the conferral of a broad power upon an 
administrator to sell a company’s business prior to creditors’ consideration of 
proposals.  Neuberger J stated that “one answer, albeit by no means a wholly 
satisfactory answer to this … is that, at least in an appropriate case, the administrator 
can informally discuss the proposal with at least some of the creditors.” 121  
                                                            
120 Re T & D Industries Limited [2000] BCC 956, 961 (Neuberger J). 
121 Ibid 962. 
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Introducing a first creditors’ meeting (or some other early consultative mechanism) to 
the UK administration regime might be a proposal worthy of consideration.   
The underlying reasoning of the decisions in Re AMI, Re Killer and Global Food – 
insofar as the Australian courts have demonstrated a willingness to endorse the 
decisions of administrators to effect justifiable early sales – might now encourage 
practitioners to “back themselves” more often and use their powers without the 
expense and delay of court involvement (particularly where informal consultations 
have yielded no objections).  It is arguable that in the UK the decisions in T & D 
Industries and Re Transbus International laid the platform for the prevalence of early 
pre-pack sales.  It is therefore conceivable that in Australia, Re AMI, Re Killer and 
Global Food may be looked back on as a collective milestone in the journey towards 
permitting pre-packs (or at least more early sales). Although the voluntary 
administration procedure differs from UK administration in requiring an early initial 
creditors’ meeting, it may not be long before the Australian courts bless an “urgent” 
early sale prior to such meeting. Australia may well be heading in the same direction 
as the UK (albeit slowly and cautiously).        
 The faith in the judgment of insolvency practitioners (as professed by White J in 
Global Food) is not unreasonable and parallel observations have been made by UK 
judges when assessing the justification for pre-packs. The difference in Australia of 
course, is that the “professional” judgment as to an early sale is made by a practitioner 
who has had no substantial pre-appointment involvement with the company.  
Australian general law, settings and practice are a timely (and possibly uncomfortable) 
reminder of how the UK has clearly compromised the perceived independence of its 
practitioners in the interests of early action to preserve business value.  Whether the 
outcomes and successes of pre-packs have justified the consequential loss of 
confidence by stakeholders in the administration regime is a matter for debate.  
        
IV  POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD IN AUSTRALIA (AND POSSIBLE WAYS 
BACK FOR THE UK) 
The “early sale” cases above demonstrate that there is presently a limit as to how far 
Australia is prepared to come in the way of countenancing early action (sales) at the 
expense of creditor participation.  Despite a general awareness of the obstacles to pre-
packing in Australia, there has been little appetite evident on the part of either 
government or commentators to formulate the sort of reforms which would be 
necessary to open the way for an increased and legitimate use of the practice in 
Australia.  The gulf between the realities of professional practice in the UK and 
Australia remain unbridged.  Talk of pre-packs in Australia largely remains just that.  
“Softer” insolvent trading laws may incentivise pre-packs on one level, but in the 
absence of other compendious changes to the law the only pre-packs which would be 
permissible in Australia would be those which entail the use of two practitioners - one 
pre-appointment adviser and one post-appointment, “independent” practitioner acting 
as administrator.  The notion of two practitioners acting on a pre-pack transaction has 
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been canvassed both in Australia and the UK. 122   In the UK this idea has 
(unsurprisingly) met with objections to the attendant costs and delay involved with a 
second practitioner’s review of a pre-packaged transaction.123  Possible legislative 
reforms facilitating pre-packs which have been floated in the course of the debate in 
Australia include (i) a “pre-pack panel” which would comprise some sort of review of 
the proposed pre-pack by a second, independent practitioner,124 (ii) some degree of 
legislative abrogation of general law independence requirements and/or (iii) 
abridgement of administration timeframes for creditor participation (already discussed 
above).   
All these suggestions would appear to attract criticism on account of costs and delay, 
or a risk of diminished professional standards which may erode overall confidence in 
voluntary administrations and the insolvency regime generally (as might be said has 
occurred in the UK).  If the bitter pill of further costs can be accepted – and it must be 
acknowledged that there are costs associated with all sorts of transactions - the notion 
of a “pre-pack panel” delivering a genuinely independent, pre-appointment review of 
a proposed sale could have merit.  Some legislative abrogation of independence 
standards could be introduced whereby an insolvency practitioner may act and advise 
upon a pre-pack, on the condition that the transaction be reviewed and approved by an 
independent practitioner prior to appointment and implementation.  The value of the 
panel process would be that the “reviewing” practitioner, unlike the pre-appointment 
adviser and prospective administrator, could not be “privately ordered” by the 
company or its directors. 
A pre-appointment review process could be embraced in the UK with the requisite 
professional and political will.   Such a process would not pose undue risk to business 
value or compromise the speed of pre-packs – there would be no post-appointment 
delay.  The only real quibble one could mount would be with the costs of the review.  
In this regard, one might ask: what price confidence in an insolvency regime?  An 
independent review is no perfect substitute for creditor participation, but it would 
                                                            
122 Wellard “UK pre-pack reforms: Pause for thought in Australia?” (2011) 23(2) Australian Insolvency 
Journal 12, 18; UK Insolvency Service’s March 2010 Consultation/Call for Evidence “Improving the 
transparency of, and confidence in, pre-packaged sales in administrations” (Option 4).  
123 UK Insolvency Service’s March 2011 Summary of consultation responses “Improving the 
transparency of, and confidence in, pre-packaged sales in administrations” 33, [7.1]-[7.6].  
124 Wellard (above n 122, 19) suggested that an independent practitioner could be appointed from such 
a panel to act as administrator and review a pre-pack proposal which had been negotiated or designed 
before his/her appointment.  Building on this idea, Paul Billingham of Grant Thornton (Sydney) and 
Leonard McCarthy of Henry Davis York (Brisbane) - in a presentation at the IPA’s National 
Conference on 1-3 June 2011 - agreed that a “pre-pack panel” might work to provide for a review and 
approval of the proposed transaction, but suggested that the pre-pack should still be implemented by 
the same practitioner who had advised the company pre-appointment.  As a matter of commercial 
reality, it is accepted that bona fide directors of companies would baulk at a process whereby their 
“pre-pack adviser” ultimately delivers them into the hands of a different practitioner to take the 
appointment as administrator and implement the transaction.  From a professional standpoint, it seems 
that practitioners would also feel uncomfortable not maintaining “ownership” and carriage of the 
insolvency solution they have helped procure for the company and its creditors.  Therefore, the notion 
of an independent review (i.e., undertaken by a practitioner from a panel which is entirely independent 
of the directors and their IP adviser) – but with the retention of the same pre-appointment practitioner 
as subsequent administrator - would appear to have merit.  Indeed, the notion of a review by a 
practitioner who does not stand to earn fees from any subsequent assignment (implementing the 
transaction) also has appeal.               
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address the independence issues which have created negative perceptions of pre-pack 
sales, especially those in favour of connected party purchasers.         
Be that as it may, further regulation of pre-packs is plainly not the flavour of the 
month, as demonstrated by the recent about-turn by the UK Government in respect of 
its 2011 proposals for a mandatory notice (to creditors) of connected-party pre-pack 
sales.  Any regulation which impinges on the current ability and discretion of UK 
practitioners to pre-pack will clearly face an uphill battle for acceptance and support.  
However, another proposal may lend itself to addressing the confidence-sapping 
practice of “connected-party pre-packs”: a proposal which has the advantages of 
leaving unfettered the speed and expediency of a pre-pack, but which might deliver to 
creditors a “royalty” or return for their disenfranchisement and exclusion from the 
voluntary administration process (including the very decision to pre-pack).  Indeed, a 
working model for such a proposal already exists in the personal bankruptcy regimes 
of both the UK and Australia.     
V  WHAT PRICE A SECOND CHANCE? - A POST-SALE INCOME 
CONTRIBUTION OBLIGATION FOR CONNECTED PARTY PRE-
PACKS 
It is well known that pre-pack sales to connected party purchasers attract the severest 
criticism and disapproval of the practice.125  Far from decrying connected party pre-
pack sales as something which should be an exception to the rule, UK proponents 
openly laud pre-packs as an appropriate “tool” for insolvency practitioners to ensure 
that a business is able to be saved by its transfer to a new entity managed by the same, 
key personnel.  This “second chance” rationale for connected party pre-packs has 
been laid bare by Frisby126 and a recent UK House of Commons Select Committee 
inquiry.   
Frisby’s 2009 analysis of the UK pre-pack’s “contribution to the “second-chance 
culture” for both businesses and owner/managers of companies”127 contended that:  
[T]here is nothing intrinsically objectionable, and certainly nothing unlawful, in 
“phoenixing”: indeed, there may be very good reasons for offering the existing 
owner/managers a second chance along with their businesses.  In many reports and 
statements of proposals to creditors, practitioners justify the phoenix by reference to a 
variety of factors, including that the connected party offer was the best available, or 
sometimes the only offer.  Where pre-pack sales are concerned, this may appear less 
than convincing given that, at best, only limited and discrete solicitation of offers for 
the business will have taken place, but where the purchaser is both integral and 
critical to the business in question, it may have some credence.128    
Frisby’s analysis demonstrated that “connected party pre-packs appear to survive on 
average longer than their unconnected party counterparts”, which “may provide some 
support for facilitating that second chance”.129  Frisby concluded that “there is room 
to suggest that the tendency towards “phoenixing” is not to be roundly condemned, as 
                                                            
125 See UK Insolvency Service’s March 2011 Summary of consultation responses, above n 123, 6 [2.3]. 
126 Frisby “The second-chance culture and beyond: some observations on the pre-pack contribution” 
(2009) Law and Financial Markets Review 242.  
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid 243. 
129 Ibid 244. 
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in many cases the phoenix will survive, and even where it does not, it will trade for a 
relatively sustained period during which it may make some positive contribution to 
the economy.”130      
These observations were reinforced in the course of the UK House of Commons 
Select Committee inquiry into The Insolvency Service,131 which convened meetings 
in early 2012 to hear contributions from representatives of peak insolvency 
associations and regulatory bodies on a variety of matters, including pre-packs.  The 
committee meeting of 24 January 2012 heard a contribution from Ms Frances 
Coulson, R3 President,132 to the effect that connected-party pre-packs are a reflection 
of the reality that:  
[I]n a large number of cases nobody else would give the [insolvent company’s] 
business a go, if you like, so I think it’s fair to say that it [pre-packing] is a valuable 
tool particularly in the SME sector and if you want people to try and then try again 
then … you have to have some sort of mechanism whereby they can do that.  Again, 
that’s not a policy decision for us to make but I think it would have an effect if that 
tool were taken away, particularly in the SME sector.133   
Pre-packing therefore appears to be very much driven by a desire to enable or provide 
small business proprietors (and their employees) a “second chance” in circumstances 
where the only beholder of business value might be the existing board or management.  
This objective, in and of itself, is patently reasonable.  Naturally, creditors will also 
stand to benefit to some extent from any insolvency procedures which preserve 
business value.  But the reality and pervasive nature of the “second-chance” rationale 
for pre-packing warrants deeper reflection as to whether there might be room for 
improvements to the legislative framework – i.e., whether the law should ask those 
who receive the benefit of a “second chance” to make a further contribution in light of 
it, particularly in circumstances where that second chance has enabled or facilitated a 
profitable, rehabilitated business.  Is it unreasonable to consider whether those 
enjoying the privilege of a “second chance” delivered by a corporate insolvency 
procedure should be compelled to make a contribution - from the income or fruit of 
the “second life” of their business – back in favour of the remaining creditors of the 
insolvent company they have left behind?  As will be seen, the insolvency regimes in 
Australia and UK reflect community expectations that this is a reasonable thing to ask 
of insolvent (bankrupt) individuals.  Is any reason not to ask the same of directors of 
“pre-packed” insolvent companies who are, in reality, enjoying a “second chance” in 
much the same manner as a bankrupt individual?    
The idea of a future income contribution would appear to be consistent with various 
UK Government policy statements leading up to the Enterprise Act 2002. The 
Executive Summary of the White Paper,134 which led to the Enterprise Act 2002, 
                                                            
130 Ibid 246. 
131 House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills Committee inquiry into the Insolvency Service, 
announced 30 November 2011.  
132 R3 is the UK insolvency trade body, the professional association for insolvency practitioners, 
representing some 97% of UK insolvency practitioners.  
133 Ibid, House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills Committee meeting regarding its inquiry 
into The Insolvency Service held on Tuesday 24 January from 10.28am to 12.28pm.  The quoted 
contribution from Ms Coulson, R3 President (including the question to which she was responding) is at 
53 mins 02 secs of the total 1hr 59 mins recording). A recording of the hearing is available on the UK 
Parliament website: http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=9951. 
134 Insolvency – A Second Chance (2001) CM 5234. 
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refers to the purpose of the reforms as being “designed to create a fairer system in 
which there is a duty of care to all creditors and all creditors are able to participate. It 
should also help to maximise economic value by aligning incentives properly….”  
Under the White Paper’s Corporate Insolvency Proposals heading at para 2.2, the 
purpose of the Enterprise Act 2002 was stated as providing “adequate incentives to 
maximise economic value” and equally to provide “an acceptable level of 
transparency and accountability to the range of stakeholders with an interest in a 
company’s affairs, particularly creditors.” At para 2.4: “on the grounds of both equity 
and efficiency, the time has come to make changes which will tip the balance firmly 
in favour of collective insolvency proceedings in which all creditors participate.” 
Similar sentiments could be put forward to support the suggested contribution 
solution. 
A connected party pre-pack (post-sale) contribution obligation could be advocated 
and justified on two grounds.  Firstly, as already mentioned, those UK and Australian 
insolvency regimes which promote a “second chance” for individual debtors have 
already enshrined income contribution obligations as a just corollary of the debtor’s 
“clean slate”.  Secondly, in a (voluntary) administration context, a contribution 
mechanism could be seen as an acknowledgement or “compensation” for the creditors’ 
loss of participation and voting rights in the administration through which a pre-pack 
sale is implemented.  Such a mechanism could be viewed as an “income contribution” 
or a “royalty”, depending on which justification holds greater appeal.   
1.  UK/Australian bankruptcy antecedents of income contribution 
mechanisms 
Income contribution mechanisms exist in both Australian and UK bankruptcy 
legislation - regimes which provide a “second-chance” for insolvent debtors similar to 
that which pre-packs deliver for the directors of insolvent companies and their 
businesses.   
The Australian bankruptcy regime (for individuals) provides for an “automatic” or 
compulsory obligation upon bankrupts to make income contributions according to 
their level of earnings.  This component of the regime (Division 4B of the Bankruptcy 
Act) was introduced in 1991, prior to which income contributions could only be 
ordered by a court upon application by the trustee in bankruptcy.135  The 1991 regime 
was introduced to provide a more effective mechanism “for obtaining income 
contributions from bankrupts who are able to make some contribution”. 136   The 
Explanatory Memorandum for the enabling legislation stated the rationale for 
mandating such a contribution:137  
Many bankrupts earn quite large incomes after bankruptcy and for all practical 
purposes are not required to make any repayment to creditors from that income.  In a 
case where the bankrupt has few if any divisible assets, the creditors will get nothing 
out of the process at all, notwithstanding that the bankrupt may have considerable 
capacity to pay.  Further, some bankrupts manage to put their assets out of the reach 
of creditors and to channel income away from themselves through the use of 
                                                            
135 Murray and Harris, Keay’s Insolvency: Personal and Corporate Law and Practice (Thomson 
Reuters, Australia 2011), [6.265].  
136Bankruptcy Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth), Explanatory Memorandum.  
137 Ibid [8]. 
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associated individuals, companies, partnerships, or trusts which are referred to in the 
Act as “associated entities” of the bankrupt.  These associated entities may, and 
usually do then provide the bankrupt with substantial non-cash benefits, such as free 
or low cost housing, motor vehicles, boats and payment of expenses.  Very often the 
entity employs the bankrupt, and by virtue of that employment, the entity is able to 
generate substantial income.  If the bankrupt ceased to be in the employment of the 
entity, its capacity to derive income would be lost.  
In the UK, under s 310 of the Insolvency Act 1986,138 a trustee in bankruptcy may 
apply to the court for an income payments order. The effect of such an order is that a 
part of the bankrupt’s income, while the bankrupt remains undischarged, must be paid 
over to the trustee. The court will not order an amount to be paid over which reduces 
the bankrupt’s income to below the level which the court believes is necessary for 
meeting the reasonable domestic needs of the bankrupt and his or her family. The 
income payments order will specify how long it is to continue. It may end when the 
bankrupt is discharged (which, in the ordinary case, will happen within 12 months) or 
last for up to three years from the date of the bankruptcy order.139 If the amount to be 
paid over to the trustee in bankruptcy can be agreed between the parties, there is no 
need to obtain a court order. Instead, an income payments agreement can be entered 
into under s 310A.140 This legally binding agreement is enforceable as if it were an 
income payments order.  
2.  The connected-party pre-pack “royalty” – putting a price on 
disenfranchising creditors from the voluntary administration process 
From a quid pro quo perspective, it is just and reasonable that unsecured creditors 
receive something for their exclusion from the (voluntary) administration process in 
circumstances where the business of their corporate debtor has been transferred to a 
company directed by the same individuals.  As outlined above, bearing in mind that it 
is the exclusion of creditors from any approval process (e.g., creditors’ meeting) 
which enables a pre-pack sale to be successfully and speedily implemented, the quid 
pro quo for the lack of a collective decision-making process could be that creditors 
stand to receive a modest benefit (e.g., percentage) of any “upside” in the way of 
income earned by the successor entity which trades the business into the future, free 
of the old company’s debts.  Put simply, it is the creditors’ non-participation which 
provides and enables the business rescue – thus, those creditors should stand to 
receive a modest contribution from the monetary rewards of that second chance.  
It should be stressed that the above proposal (and the justifications for it) would only 
apply to connected party pre-pack sales.  Only where the successor entity is directed, 
managed or owned by the same individuals could it be legitimately contended that the 
pre-pack has delivered a “second-chance” justifying some sort of contribution 
obligation.   
3. Possible objections 
                                                            
138 A similar provision was previously contained in s51 Bankruptcy Act 1914 but appears not to have 
been utilised effectively (see the Cork Committee’s discussion and recommendations at paras 591-598 
and 1158-1163 which led to the introduction of s310). 
139 See generally Miller “Income Payments Orders” (2002) 18 Insolvency Law and Practice 43. 
140 This provision was introduced by s260 Enterprise Act 2002 and came into force in April 2004. 
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There is an obvious objection to translating this type of provision into the corporate 
world of the pre-pack. In bankruptcy law, it is the same debtor who has failed to pay 
his or her debts who is being ordered to pay a proportion of future income towards the 
payment of those debts. In the context of a pre-pack (to connected persons) it would 
seem contrary to the principle of separate corporate legal personality to make income 
from “Newco” be used to pay off (to some extent) the debts of “Oldco”. There is 
though, the corporate precedent of making successor companies liable for certain 
rights of employees which have been breached by the predecessor company where the 
breach occurred due to the transfer of the business. Such rights against “Oldco” are 
transferred to “Newco”.141 
It is also arguably “fair” that “Newco” (in a connected party pre-pack) should be 
asked to contribute. In the context of the payment of pre-appointment fees, the UK 
High Court has been asked to consider: “whether the advantage to the purchasing 
directors in retaining a business shorn of debt is clearly outweighed by the advantage 
derived by creditors from the pre-pack.” The answer was: “Where the directors … are 
the purchasers, it is rarely possible to establish clearly that the balance of advantage is 
in the creditors’ favour.”142 From this it would appear that where a pre-pack is in 
favour of connected persons, it will be rare for the pre-pack to be seen as to the 
advantage of the creditors. If the pre-pack is to the advantage of the connected 
persons, it would seem fair and reasonable that if the business is successful, then it 
should be asked to contribute to the satisfaction of the debts owed by the predecessor 
company 
4. Valuations, “crystal ball” projections and “strike oil” scenarios  
It might also be contended that a pre-pack administrator who obtains proper value for 
a business sale will ensure that creditors receive all they could (or should) ever 
justifiably ask for.  With an arms-length investor or purchaser this argument would 
carry considerable weight – and it could not be said that the new directors of the 
successor entity were enjoying a “second-chance” in the commonly understood 
meaning of the term.  Even for a connected party sale it might still be argued that a 
contribution mechanism is unjustified if the administrator (as agent of the insolvent 
corporate vendor) has obtained proper value for the sale which comprises or 
represents future cash flow earnings of the rescued business, discounted for present 
value and the risk assumed by the purchaser. 
However, the inadequacies of valuations in the context of business rescue and creditor 
participation have been demonstrated by decisions such as Re Bluebrook Ltd (“IMO 
Carwash”)143 where the court observed that while a “going concern” valuation may 
clearly be appropriate, there are various, alternative valuation methodologies which 
present themselves.  The IMO Carwash decision also demonstrates the potential 
unfairness which can arise from “valuing out” junior or unsecured creditors from an 
insolvency process.   
                                                            
141 See the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (2006/246) and the 
courts’ recent interpretations of the insolvency provisions of those regulations in Key2Law (Surrey) 
LLP v De’Antiquis [2011] EWCA Civ 1567 and Spaceright Europe Ltd v Baillavoine [2011] EWCA 
Civ 1565. 
142 Re Johnson Machine and Tool Co Ltd [2010] BCC 382 per HHJ Purle at para 5. See also Re Kayley 
Vending Ltd [2009] BCC 578. 
143 [2009] EWHC 2114 (Ch); [2010] B.C.C. 209. 
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IMO Carwash dealt with a challenge to a scheme of arrangement which - in very 
general terms - effected a pre-pack transfer of an insolvent company’s business and 
senior secured debt to a new company (“Newco”), leaving behind junior debt in the 
insolvent company (“Oldco”).  Oldco, by virtue of the business transfer, was to 
become a mere, assetless shell.  Junior secured creditors were denied any vote on the 
scheme because the accepted range of enterprise value of the business was assessed to 
be less than even the quantum of the senior lenders’ debt, rendering the subordinated 
creditors unable to point to an “economic interest” in the outcome of the scheme.  
Mann J assessed a range of differing valuation approaches to determine the competing 
valuations proffered by the proponents of the scheme and the objecting creditors.  
One of the possible going-concern methodologies for valuing a business (and which 
was considered by Mann J among a range of alternative methodologies)144 is an 
income or Discounted Cash Flow (“DCF”) approach which “indicates business 
realisation proceeds based on the cash flow that the business can be expected to 
generate in the future.”145       
In the final analysis, Mann J identified significant failings in the competing valuation 
evidence submitted by the objectors to the scheme (e.g., an absence of detailed 
underlying assumptions).  Mann J found for an enterprise value in a range which was 
(at its highest) much less than the senior debt.   Mann J found that he could not 
conclude that the junior lenders were “getting a raw deal because there is a good or 
even reasonable case for saying that they are being deprived of value.”146  While the 
decision appears eminently justified on the evidence put before the court, the reasons 
of Mann J beg the question as to what the court would have made of the scheme if the 
competing valuations were closer.  Seah, in analysing the effect of the IMO Carwash 
decision, contends that “the pendulum has on many occasions swung too far in favour 
of safeguarding the senior claimants’ interests”.147  Seah persuasively makes the case 
for creditors who are understandably aggrieved at being “valued out” of participation 
in an insolvency procedure:148 
The Senior Creditors and the scheme companies were unanimous in wishing to keep 
the businesses of the companies as going concerns so as to actualize any benefits 
which may accrue following a successful rehabilitation of the companies, thereby 
increasing the prospects of … repayment of the Senior Debt in due course.  To 
achieve such rehabilitation, the scheme terms contemplated the transfer of the assets 
of the scheme companies to the Newcos.  The balance sheets of the reconstituted 
companies were thereby significantly improved… 
The improved balance sheets of the Newcos with the resultant reduced gearing ratios 
would significantly improve the prospects of the Newcos obtaining new credit lines 
or other financial accommodation for their operations, thereby increasing chances of 
a successful rehabilitation.  Any upsides of a successful rehabilitation (assuming they 
                                                            
144 For a considered discussion of the various methodologies for valuing the business of a financially 
distressed company (including those canvassed in IMO Carwash), see Purcell “Distressed Valuation” 
(2009) 6(1) International Corporate Rescue 17, Purcell “The Courts Speak on Valuation in 
Restructurings: IMO Carwash, SAS and Wind Hellas Lessons” (2010) 7(2) International Corporate 
Rescue 129 and Whiter “Valuation Disputes in Restructurings: More to Come” (2010) 7(1) 
International Corporate Rescue 3. 
145 Ibid [11] (Mann J). 
146 Ibid [52] (Mann J). 
147 Seah “The Re Tea Corporation Principle and Junior Creditors’ Rights to Participate in a Scheme of 
Arrangement – A View from Singapore” (2011) 20 International Insolvency Review 161, 183.   
148 Ibid 175.  
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materialize) would however accrue to the Senior Creditors exclusively as the Junior 
Creditors had been cut-off from the new structure and left with claims against shell 
companies.       
The IMO Carwash decision highlights the potential problems and unfairness when 
valuations are used to determine the extent of creditors’ ability to participate and/or 
share in the benefits of a successful business rescue or rehabilitation.  Valuations are 
invariably an inexact science.  An Irish judge recently observed (in the context of 
another valuation exercise relating to a scheme) that “[t]he business of economic 
forecasting is notoriously difficult; its sole function according to J.K. Galbraith being 
to make astrology look respectable.” 149   Upon initiation of an administration 
procedure, it is the interests of creditors which are paramount vis a vis the company’s 
assets.  Should it not be the creditors’ decision to “sell” (i.e., accept the valuation on 
offer from a connected party) or to “hold” (i.e., hold out for a better offer or even 
propose a CVA/DOCA or longer work-out)?   
Proponents of pre-packs laud the procedure as a “business rescue tool”.  However, an 
upfront, “enterprise value” or pre-packaged approach to business rescue which denies 
creditor participation presses further the awkward question referred to above – for 
whose benefit is the business being rescued?  In any event, rather than proposing that 
pre-pack sales without collective approval be prohibited, a workable “compromise 
position” might be to introduce an income contribution mechanism for connected 
party pre-packs.  This mechanism would preserve the efficacy of pre-packs (and the 
business rescue outcomes they deliver) while recognising that in a connected 
party/phoenix scenario, pre-packs constitute a dramatic abrogation of creditors’ rights 
of participation.  The loss of participation rights in a connected party pre-pack 
business rescue merits a modest stake for creditors in the ultimate success of the 
attempt at business rehabilitation.   
In circumstances where the connected party purchaser is the only party interested in 
the business (Frisby and Coulson suggest this is not uncommon), it would be 
interesting to know if it is customary for administrators to insist upon a sale 
consideration calculated according to a “DCF” formula.  As mentioned, a purchase 
price which incorporates future projected (discounted) cash flow could possibly 
counter any suggestion that creditors should receive a subsequent “premium” on the 
initial, agreed sale consideration.  Some pre-pack commentary has referred to the fact 
that many pre-pack sales incorporate deferred consideration terms,150 but again it is 
unclear if such terms customarily endeavour to ensure that “dumped” creditors retain 
a direct stake in the potential upside (i.e., profits) of a subsequently successful 
business rescue.  There might be scope for insolvency practitioners to negotiate a pre-
pack sale which incorporates something similar to an income contribution mechanism.  
However, this would be very much a matter for the commercial will of the parties 
involved.  If an administrator is provided with a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer by a 
connected party which cannot be matched – or indeed where there is no competing 
bidder to be found at all, as Frisby observed151  – then there is a reasonable argument 
that the administrator has little room to do anything but accept the best (or only) offer 
on the table.  That scenario is where a mandated contribution mechanism for 
                                                            
149 Re McInerney Homes Ltd [2011] IESC 31, [54] (O’Donnell J). 
150 Frisby “A preliminary analysis of pre-packaged administrations” (August 2007) Report to The 
Association of Business Recovery Professionals (R3), 74.  
151 See above n 128. 
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connected party pre-packs would instil some confidence in the process – particularly 
from the perspective of creditors whose debts are seen as significant enough to 
“dump”, but not deserving enough to participate in the decision to pre-pack.      
5. Design and implementation of a contribution mechanism for connected 
party pre-packs 
The existing bankruptcy regime contribution mechanisms which exist in the UK and 
Australia already provide a template model for a similar contribution obligation for 
connected party pre-packs.  Appropriate income thresholds and earning periods152 for 
a contribution mechanism could be debated, as could the appropriate definition of 
“connected party”.  It should be stressed that the contribution mechanism proposed 
herein is one which would be contingent upon income being earned incidental to a 
successful business rescue.  In their analysis of outcomes in CVAs in the UK, Frisby 
and Walters noted that “one might suggest that the ‘ethos’ of the CVA procedure 
requires this sacrifice from owners and managers” and that some CVA proposals 
“envisage that contributions to the CVA may rise according to the profits of the 
company, which … appears to be a reasonable term.”153  If a connected party pre-
pack resulted in a second business failure or poor earnings then no contribution 
obligation would arise.154  Liquidations would need to be “held open” for the period 
of time in which the assessment periods and contribution obligations would operate, 
but this would not appear to provide any significant difficulties in terms of time and 
cost.   
It is acknowledged that a contribution mechanism is less attractive (and may even be 
self-defeating) in circumstances where a genuine “white knight” investor is looking to 
step up to the business rescue plate.  There will always be varying degrees of 
“connected party” status of a pre-pack purchaser.  The contribution mechanism would 
need to be designed so that third party, arms-length investors are not discouraged 
from pre-pack sales merely because (for example) one key director of the old 
company is maintaining a presence with the new entity taking over the business.  As 
always, an appropriate balance would need to be struck.    
Consideration would also need to be given as to whether the contribution obligation 
should work as an “adjustment” mechanism (providing retrospective integrity to 
upfront valuations), or alternatively operate as a premium, “royalty” obligation 
regardless of whether the valuation (purchase price) is proven to be accurate by the 
subsequent performance of the business.  There may lie a risk of “robbing Peter to 
pay Paul” if connected party purchasers were simply able to discount the purchase 
price paid for a pre-pack sale in order to off-set any apprehended income contribution.  
This outcome could be avoided by the administrator’s insistence upon a sale 
                                                            
152 In Australia the trustee-in-bankruptcy assesses a bankrupt’s income for each “contribution 
assessment period” which is every 12 month period from the commencement of the bankruptcy (or less 
than 12 months if the bankrupt is discharged or the bankruptcy annulled): ss 139K and 139W 
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).  In Australia a bankrupt is automatically discharged after 3 years in the 
absence of any objections: s 149 Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). In the UK an income payments order or 
agreement may last up to three years even though the bankrupt will be discharged within 12 months. 
153 Walters and Frisby “Preliminary Report to the Insolvency Service into Outcomes in Company 
Voluntary Arrangements” (23 March 2011), 17 (n 39). 
154 It should be mentioned that the prevalence of second chance business failures (or “serial” pre-
packing of the same business) raises its own separate ground for a policy debate of the merits of pre-
packing.    
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consideration calculated by reference to a customary valuation which excludes from 
the mix any future (contingent) contribution obligation imposed by statute.  It would 
only be a connected-party purchaser who could argue that the “present value” of the 
business would be reduced by a future contribution obligation.  To the rest of the 
marketplace (ie., potential arms-length purchasers) the value of a business would be 
unaffected by any contingent contribution obligation and this is the value which an 
administrator must obtain for a pre-packed business if an income contribution 
mechanism were to work effectively.  The relevant legislation could expressly 
mandate that an administrator effecting a connected-party pre-pack sale must obtain 
proper value without any reduction or deduction on account of the compulsory 
income contribution.  
Even if such a discount was proscribed, it would still need to be determined whether 
the contribution will merely ensure the return to creditors which should have been 
reflected in the purchase price but was not (because the DCF assessment at the time of 
sale has later been shown to be inadequate) or alternatively if the contribution should 
charge a “royalty” even where the DCF underlying the purchase price has proven to 
be an accurate forecast of the earnings of the rehabilitated business.  As discussed 
above, it may be that a connected-party bid for a business is the “only offer on the 
table”.155   In this scenario, there may not be much of a going concern or DCF 
valuation methodology to speak of (over and above basic asset values).  In such a 
scenario an income contribution regime would go at least some way toward a 
“corrective” adjustment mechanism (if not a royalty) when a modest purchase price 
does not reflect the reality of the fortunes of a successfully rehabilitated business.  (In 
this scenario, if the contribution was merely to operate as a subsequent “adjustment” 
to the initial DCF valuation, the administrator would presumably have to attribute (or 
compel the purchaser to attribute) part of the purchase price to DCF or “future-
earnings” so that a comparison to actual earnings could later be made and the 
necessary adjustment effected by means of the income contribution.)                  
6. Expediency with fairness 
The contribution mechanism would be entirely consistent with the “rescue culture” 
and the idea of the “second chance.” It would go some way to counter the complaint 
from some that pre-packs give a business an unfair advantage over its competitors, 
have a significant, negative knock-on effect on its own suppliers and are bad for the 
economy as a whole.156 The pre-packaged business, if successful second time around, 
would share its success with its former creditors and would encourage those former 
creditors to continue to trade with it, as they would have a clear stake in its success. It 
would encourage the survival of the pre-packaged business and its suppliers. The 
concept of a “second chance” might be taken literally so that the contribution 
mechanism could be combined with a prohibition of a further connected party pre-
pack of the business within a certain time period. There would be no third or fourth 
chance. 
In the context of the straightforward, “second-chance” connected party pre-pack, it is 
difficult to contest that a contribution mechanism would introduce to many garden 
                                                            
155 Frisby, above n 128. 
156 See e.g., the letter from the Association of British Insurers to the Insolvency Service found at: 
http://www.abi.org.uk/Media/Releases/2009/08/ABI_calls_on_Insolvency_Service_to__improve_trans
parency_of_prepack_administrations.aspx (last accessed 1st April 2012). 
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variety UK pre-packs added fairness and creditor-confidence.  From the perspective 
of an unsecured creditor, it is contended that the SIP 16 information disclosures 
(important though they are) pale in comparison with a contribution mechanism which 
would deliver a self-executing, monetary stake in a business rescue which the creditor 
may be powerless to prevent or even influence.157                         
VI  CONCLUSION 
Australia’s resistance to the UK brand of pre-packing may be an uncomfortable but 
instructive point of reference for UK policy-makers and practitioners.  It is something 
of an oddity that independence standards in the mother country have so profoundly 
diverged from the Australian general law (or perhaps it is the other way round).  That 
said, it is an open question as to whether the clear loss of perceived independence of 
UK insolvency practitioners is offset by the successes delivered by pre-packs in the 
way of business rescues and jobs retention.  The above analysis has endeavoured to 
acknowledge the successes of pre-packs and also highlight the underlying reasons for 
the success of the practice.  The controversial facets of pre-packs (i.e., creditor 
disenfranchisement, pre-appointment practitioner involvement and the early exercise 
of administrator power) are the very things which enable pre-packs successfully to 
rescue businesses.      
In both jurisdictions, policy makers and practitioners should not lose sight of the 
original ideals which promoted the introduction of voluntary administrations in the 
first place: that is, the notion of rescuing a distressed company (or its business) for the 
benefit of creditors (secured and unsecured).  Voluntary administration was not 
introduced primarily to deliver directors or management of small businesses a 
“second chance”.  Practitioners and policy makers might reflect a little more on 
whether the profitable businesses of some distressed companies could be made to 
work just a little harder for “Oldco” (the existing corporate owner and its creditors) 
instead of taking the expedient route of a second-chance “dump and transfer” pre-
pack sale to “Newco”.  This is a question which any prospective administrator should 
be critically considering before deciding whether to engineer a pre-pack in the first 
place.   
It is debateable whether the ability of prospective UK administrators to undertake 
significant pre-appointment transactional work means that threshold decisions to pre-
pack may not always undergo the same rigour of “critical” analysis which might be 
applied by practitioners who are not privately consulted, or “privately ordered” by a 
director. Debates as to professional standards, independence and ethics often focus on 
extreme examples of conduct, misconduct or conflicts. However, the reality of 
professional insolvency practice is that honest, reputable professionals are consulted 
by a “client” and asked to proffer “solutions” for a corporate distress scenario. As 
with all reputable professionals doing their level-best in a competitive, consumer-
driven marketplace, the competing interests of the “client”, the company and creditors 
can present judgment calls which are often more grey than black or white. Few would 
disagree that thoroughly unscrupulous professionals are a rarity in both jurisdictions.  
However, putting to one side the clear cases of abuse which will arise in any system, 
it is not unreasonable to ask further whether the prevalence and popularity of UK pre-
packs reflect the fact that for some companies the practice is being used as a tool of 
                                                            
157 Some creditors may be able to hold and exercise some commercial leverage in a pre-pack sale (e.g., 
by being a key supplier). 
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convenience for directors rather than being one option in a considered assessment of 
all possible alternatives - including, say, a work-out with collective creditor support 
where a profitable business could “stay where it is” and be put to work for the benefit 
of the insolvent company and its creditors (e.g., through a DOCA or CVA). 
In their analysis of CVA outcomes, Frisby and Walters identified the ambivalence of 
directors or equity holders toward trading on for creditors rather than themselves:    
One important aspect of the possible move towards longer CVAs is that it effectively 
locks out equity holders from at least a proportion of their possible dividend for a 
considerable period.  Where the company in question does not distribute dividends, 
and instead its owners are also managers/directors who receive a … salary calculated 
with reference to profits [available for the purpose of distribution] the same applies: 
such owners/managers are subjecting themselves to an ‘austerity’ schedule of quite 
some length.  There is, of course, absolutely nothing objectionable in this, but … to 
put it simply, owner/managers may find that the effort of continuing to trade, when 
little or no return is generated to them personally, ultimately hollow. … Again, this is 
speculative, and the matter could usefully be investigated further, but well-advised 
directors may find themselves with alternative strategies from which to choose, the 
obvious one being a pre-pack administration under which they themselves acquire the 
business and assets of the company free of its debts.158         
The ability to pre-pack arguably disincentivises the CVA as a genuine alternative to 
address a company’s insolvency.   
In any event, it appears that pre-packs will very much remain in the UK 
administrator’s “toolkit” and that there is little appetite to impair their expediency in 
terms of regulating implementation process (e.g., by mandating creditor/court 
participation).  That being the case, an income contribution mechanism is one 
proposal which could restore some balance to the “outcome-process pendulum” 
which in the UK has arguably swung a little too far towards expediency at the 
expense of process and creditor confidence.  Creditor participation has been a long-
accepted hallmark of insolvency systems said to be worthy of stakeholder 
confidence.159  It is clear that this aspect of the Australian insolvency landscape will 
die hard.  The UK and Australia may both serve as examples of jurisdictions where 
the “outcome-process pendulum” has swung too far, but in opposite directions.  It 
may be that neither jurisdiction has yet found the right balance. Perhaps lessons can 
be learned both ways.        
The attraction of a connected party pre-pack contribution mechanism is that it delivers 
a quid pro quo or “royalty” to creditors for their disenfranchisement, while still 
allowing such pre-packs to deliver expediently “second chances” in the SME sector.  
An income contribution proposal warrants consideration and reflection, not just in the 
UK (to correct a perceived imbalance) but also in Australia as that jurisdiction 
continues to broach questions of if, and how, creditor participation should be 
compromised in the interests of achieving better business rescue outcomes. 
                                                            
158 Walters and Frisby, above n 155, 16-17. 
159 Harmer Report (ALRC 45, General Insolvency Inquiry, 1988), Part I, Aims of insolvency law–
Principles, para 33; Cork Committee at e.g., paras 232, 914,917 and 919.  
